A Foreign Office Perspective on the British Withdrawal from Palestine by Garstin, Jonathan
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Garstin, Jonathan   (2021) A Foreign Office Perspective on the British Withdrawal from Palestine.
  Master of Arts by Research (MARes) thesis, University of Kent,.
DOI






University of Kent 
 





A Dissertation Submitted to the School of History  
 
In Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of Master of Arts by 
















A FO perspective on the United States and the British Withdrawal from Palestine....24 
The End of the Anglo-American Initiative and the London Conference…………….43 
Chapter Two………………………………………………………………………………...57 
The Foreign Office Perspective on Withdrawal and the Arab States………...………57 















A Foreign Office Perspective on the British Withdrawal from Palestine 
 
Between 1945-47 civil unrest in the British Mandate of Palestine engulfed the nation, and as 
a result, the Foreign Office (FO) became heavily involved in trying to facilitate a solution. 
The Arab and Jewish communities became increasingly hostile to one another and to Britain, 
who was viewed as not protecting their respective interests, and fulfilling her security 
obligations. This study focuses on the FO’s priorities and perspectives during the withdrawal 
from Palestine, and for the FO, the desires of these two communities in Palestine were not the 
main priorities. Maintaining relations with the Arab states and the United States were the 
major preoccupations for the FO during this period, who were vital allies in the Cold War 
against the Soviet Union. The United States was Britain’s most important global ally, and the 
FO did not wish to adversely affect this relationship over Palestine. Despite this, the FO was 
consistent and mostly unified in rejecting American policy desires. Relations with the Arab 
states took priority, and the Eastern Department was central to placing priority on Arab 
relations when dealing with the future of Palestine. This was motivated by the precarious 
strategic position of Britain in the Middle East, which was caused by growing Arab 
nationalism resulting in demands for British withdrawal from key regional allies. The loss of 
military rights in the Middle East was the main FO concern. It was believed that Soviet 
influence would drastically expand into the Middle East, and prejudice British international 
position severely if relations with the Arab states was sacrificed to appease American policy 
desires.  
Warnings from the FO of tensions in Palestine had preexisted, and these came to a 
head between 1936-39 with Palestinian Arabs revolting against Jewish immigration and the 
British presence in Palestine. This event split the two communities further and harmed British 
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relations with both peoples. It also unified Palestinian Arabs in their desire to become an 
independent Arab majority state, who also sought to end Jewish immigration.1 This helped 
create division between the two communities and made future cooperation less probable. In 
an attempt find a solution, the Palestine Royal Commission was formed by Britain. On 7 July 
1937, the commission recommended partition as the solution, and the Palestine Partition 
Commission, 21 February 1938, was created to draw up the technical details. This was 
condemned by Palestine Arabs and the Arab states, and found only partial acceptance within 
the Jewish Agency, and was rejected by the Zionist Congress.2 This resulted in the British 
government forming the St James's Palace Conference, where it negotiated with both sides 
and ended with publication of the White Paper of 1939. This paper limited Jewish 
immigration and land purchases, and proposed self-governance within ten years.3 During the 
Second World War unrest in Palestine reduced drastically due to the mutual support in the 
fight against Nazi Germany. However, after the end of the war the British position in 
Palestine once again became complicated by the incompatible demands of both communities. 
The genocide and atrocities committed against the Jewish people by Nazi Germany caused 
large scale displacement due to many Jewish people desiring to leave Central and Eastern 
Europe. As a result, Palestine received a large influx of Jewish immigrants, which exceeded 
the quotas established in the White Paper.4 Despite both sides being against the original 
White Paper at the time, the Arabs called upon Britain to enforce it and stop large scale 
 
1 For greater understanding on the effect of the Arab revolt in Palestine 1936-1939 on Arab Palestinian 
national identity see, E.Nashif, Palestinian Political Prisoners, Identity and Community, (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2008) , [Accessed Online 08/10/2020], <ndl.ethernet.edu.et>  
2 For more information on The 1937 Peel Commission and the decision to recommend partition see; 
P.Sinanoglou, “British Plans for the Partition of Palestine, 1929-1938”, The Historical Journal 52, no. 1, 
[Accessed Online 11/11/2019] , < http://www.jstor.org/stable/40264161>  
3 Palestine Statement of Policy, Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by 
Command of His Majesty, 23 May 1939, [Accessed Online 27/05/20],  
<https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/> 
4 For more details on the acceptance of the White Paper of 1939, and the process which led to its creation see; 
M.Cohen, “Appeasement in the Middle East: The British White Paper on Palestine, May 1939”, The Historical 




Jewish immigration. From the Jewish perspective, under the Balfour Declaration of 2 
November 1917, the Jewish people had been promised a national home, and considering the 
circumstances of the Jewish plight in Europe, it was believed that Britain must now honour 
this declaration.5 It was under these circumstances that the FO attempted to mediate a 
resolution between the two sides. The differences between the demands of these two 
communities in Palestine made finding a solution incredibly difficult, and external pressures 
as well as British interests would exacerbate the situation further.  
Outside the events in Palestine Britain was facing a period of reflection of its new 
international role. After the Second World War it became clear that the British Empire would 
face a transformation, and that many nations within the Empire would become independent. 
It was also clear that the Soviet Union was likely to maintain its position in Central and 
Eastern Europe. This changed the relationship of the wartime allies, to that of adversaries. 
While the loss of India may have reduced the importance of the Middle East and Suez Canal 
to Britain, the clear divide between Britain and the Soviet Union made the security of the 
Middle East a priority.6 The Middle East was viewed by British military planners as essential 
for Britain to maintain an offensive against the Soviet Union, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) 
warned the Cabinet that it was “essential to our defence that we should be able to fight from 
the Middle East in war…”.7 The Second World War had demonstrated the importance of 
Egypt in maintaining global communications and supply lines as well for the defence of the 
Middle East. Palestine was an effective screen to defend Egypt, who by the end of the war 
was calling for British withdrawal.8 These circumstances meant that a British withdrawal 
 
5 For greater detail on the impact of the Balfour Declaration on Jewish calls for a home state see, M.Friedman, 
“The State of Israel as a Theological Dilemma”, in B.Kimmerling, The Israeli State and Society, Boundaries and 
Frontiers, (New York: State University of New-York Press, 1989) 
6 For COS views on the importance of the Middle East to British security see, C.P, (46) 267, 10 July 1946, CAB 
129/II, TNA. 
7 Cabinet Minutes (47) 6, Minute 3, Confidential Annex, January 15, 1947, CAB 128/II, TNA 
8 War Office Report, The Palestine Problem, October 1945, WO 201/192/12154506, TNA. 
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from Palestine would have dire effects on Britain’s military position in the Middle East, and 
if other Arab states refused to provide future military rights then Britain’s entire position in 
the Middle East could be undone. To complicate the situation further, the United States 
became increasingly involved in the Palestine crisis. The United States was a vital British 
ally, with the resources and manpower to help secure Europe from Soviet intrusion, and the 
two world powers cooperated on an unprecedented scale. However, the President of the 
United States, Harry Truman, faced lobbying in the United States to push for Jewish 
immigration into Palestine, and there was significant domestic sympathy to support this.9 As 
a result, Truman publicly and repeatedly called for the entry of 100,000 Jewish immigrants 
into Palestine. This went against the terms of the White Paper and the British position. Britain 
sought cooperation with the United States on the matter to an extent. However, British policy 
makers became increasingly frustrated at American intervention, which greatly agitated the 
Arabs, harming British interests.  
For the FO there were two major relationships to consider regarding Palestine. To 
some surprise, this was not regarding ties with the Arab Higher Committee or that of the 
Jewish Agency, who were the main representatives to their respective communities. For the 
FO, the two key concerns were, cooperation with the United States and maintaining Arab 
goodwill. The former being Britain’s most important ally to prevent future Soviet 
encroachment. The latter vital to ensuring Britain was able to hold its paramount position in 
the Middle East. Therefore, during the Palestine crises 1945-48, the British government 
focused on primarily dealing with the United States and Arab states as the solution to the 
 
9 For information on the domestic pressures Truman faced to gain a favourable outcome in Palestine to the 
Jewish people see, M.Jones, Failure in Palestine, British and United States Policy after the Second World War, 
(London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1986) pp.136-9; R.Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance, Britain, The 
United States, the Dominions and the Cold War, 1945-51, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985) pp.146-164;                                                                                        
P.Grose, “The President Versus the Diplomats”, in W.Stookey & R. Louis, The End of the Palestine Mandate, 
(London: I.B.Tauris,1986) pp.40-55. 
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matter. From July 1945 until July 1946, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, led 
British efforts to find an Anglo-American solution to the matter, which was met with 
opposition from within the FO, and eventually the whole attempt diminished in the face of 
Truman’s actions, which caused a lack of faith in Cabinet. As a result, the Colonial Office 
was encouraged to find a solution, which had FO input, resulting in the evaporation of an 
Anglo-American initiative. Between August 1946 and February 1947, focus was placed on 
finding a solution with the Arabs, something the Eastern Department deemed essential. To 
this end the London Conference was created for Britain to meditate a solution between the 
three parties. They were: The Arab Higher Committee, The Jewish Agency, and The Arab 
League. The Arab League was the only party to agree to take part formally, and the FO was 
focused on finding a solution acceptable to the Arab states, having no desire to alienate to 
maintain a credible military position in the Middle East, to prevent Soviet influence.  
Therefore, this study will focus on the United States and Arab States as its primary focus in 
understanding the perspectives of the FO on the two key relationships they deemed most 
important.  
The FO did not hold an entirely united position during the switch from American to 
Arab engagement, although there was a clear and unyielding consensus from the Eastern 
Department. This consensus was that alienating the Arabs would have the most catastrophic 
effect on Britain’s future position in the Middle East. The Eastern Department was the FO 
division directly concerned with Palestine, as a result focus on the individuals within this 
division will be emphasized in this study. Due to the importance of the United States, the 
Northern American Department will also be considered. These two departments reported to 
their head, the Permanent Under-Secretary, Orme Sargent, and as a result the conversations 




This study will argue that the FO perspective during the British withdrawal form 
Palestine was consistent and mostly unified. That it placed priority on maintaining favourable 
relations with the Arab states, over that of the United States or the two communities in 
Palestine, and that an awareness of rising Arab nationalism motivated this priority. The first 
chapter investigates Britain’s relationship with the United States, and how Bevin tried to 
purse an Anglo-American solution to the crises. It will be argued that the Eastern Department 
was at times dismayed by Truman’s desires, and led calls to reject an Anglo-American 
solution, citing alienating the Arabs and prejudicing Britain’s position in the Middle East. 
Despite some deviation from a few individuals within the FO, who attempted to provide 
some support to Bevin, it will be argued that this was only momentary and a minority view, 
and that overall, the FO welcomed the collapse of the Anglo-American initiative. The second 
half of this chapter will argue that the FO perspective became increasingly untied and vocal 
in its rejection of American policy desires. That Truman lost significant credibility after his 
rejection of the Anglo-American initiative, and that this sentiment was shared in the Cabinet. 
It will also be argued that the FO was willing to compromise with the Colonial Office on a 
solution, to gain cross department consensus against scrapping the White Paper of 1939, to 
maintain favourable relations with the Arab states. Also, it will be argued that deviations 
from the mostly unified FO view reduced during this period, and the few examples of this 
were isolated incidents which were rejected elsewhere in the FO.   
The seconds chapter will build upon the consistent and mostly unified perspective that 
the FO priority was maintaining favourable relations with the Arab states. It will be argued 
that the FO was primarily motivated by Britain’s need to maintain military rights in the 
Middle East. This was vital to maintaining a credible military position in the Middle East, 
and necessary to protect British interests and prevent Soviet intrusion into the region. The 
chapter will argue that relations with Britain’s key Arab allies was rapidly deteriorating, 
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owing to growing Arab nationalism, and that the British were facing losing military rights in 
Egypt and Iraq permanently. This made maintaining relations with the Arabs a priority, and 
that the only limited deviation from this was in supporting King Abdullah’s plans, which if 
endorsed may have isolated Britain and Transjordan from the Arabs. The second half of this 
chapter investigates how the FO sought to deal with the Arabs collectively at the London 
Conference, and how rising Arab nationalism effected FO thought. It will be argued that FO 
policy continued to be motivated by appeasing Arab demands, and that the FO did not purse 
divisive actions, by attempting to find a solution with one or two Arab states. Arguing that 
the FO did not seek to purse possible leverages over one or two Arabs states because of a 
growing awareness of Arab nationalism, and the domestic pressure this put on the various 
Arab states.  It will be concluded that the FO was so concerned with rising Arab nationalism 
and the impending loss of Britain’s position in the Middle East, that it felt compelled to 
prioritise relations with the Arab states when considering a solution to the crises. This study 
approaches this subject in a chronological fashion provides context to a complex and 
evolving situation and helps to understand the two distinct phases British policy went through 
in dealing with the crises, from an Anglo-American solution to an Anglo-Arab negotiation. It 
is under this narrative that the FO views, and their evolution can be best understood, during 
the stages the British Cabinet and Bevin went through in developing their Palestine policy. 
This study seeks to bring more understanding to the FO view on the process leading 
to the British withdrawal from Palestine. To obtain this, the vast archival material available at 
the National Archives in Kew has been drawn upon, which houses the biggest FO collection 
of files from the time. Using the original FO files to gain a fuller understanding provides a 
historical primary source driven approach to obtain a true reflection of the thoughts of the 
officials of the time, by drawing upon their writing and discussions. There is much historical 
coverage of the events leading to the creation of Israeli, and the British perspective is also 
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well explored. However, as will be demonstrated, there is clear need for greater 
understanding of the FO views on the matter which have often been neglected. This is due to 
the focus of the British perspective being based around the strong personality of Bevin, and to 
a lesser extent Arthur Creech Jones (Secretary of State for the Colonies). Furthermore, the 
demands of the Colonial Office and the COS are given secondary focus, and these histories 
often lack a fuller understanding of the various views in the FO. It is due to these reasons this 
study will attempt to bring new light to the subject. The British withdrawal from Palestine 
was one of the most complex after the Second World War, and today the creation of Israel 
and Palestine’s lack of nationhood are still an ongoing and seemingly unresolvable conflict. 
The FO was instrumental to carrying out the negotiations and is important to understand what 
advice and concerns the British government was receiving from the most relevant office. The 
crisis was not limited to the administration of the Mandate and remit of the Colonial Office, 
having large external ramifications for British foreign policy. Britain’s main concerns during 
the withdrawal from Palestine were in maintaining Anglo-American and Anglo-Arab 
cooperation. Therefore, understanding British policy from the perspective of the office 
responsible for mediation with these nations is vital.  
The British perspective and other relevant material about the British withdrawal from 
Palatine is separated by three specific periods: the earliest contributions during the 1940s and 
1950s, followed by substantial contributions in the 1980s, with more specific focuses to the 
subject in the 1990s and 2000s. The earliest insights into the topic come from the work of 
George Antonius, Reader Bullard, A.Fitzsimons and Elizabeth Monroe. They provide 
coverage of Arab nationalism and the views of the British government. Antonius provides 
early insight into the background of the matters surrounding the British withdrawal from 
Palestine which he viewed as “the most notorious and least successful of all the mandatory 
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ventures.”10 His works focuses on rising Arab nationalism and the moves the Arab states 
were taking to remove themselves from the control of western powers. Antonius book has 
faced criticism since its publication, such as from Efraim Karsh, who claims that he 
oversimplified the motives to rising Arab Nationalism, and the development of the 
movement.11 Despite disagreements on this matter, Antonius’ overall assessment of Arab 
states moving towards more equal partnerships with France and Britain (or neither) is agreed 
upon. This is clear in the violence and unrest in Arab states against foreign dominance, and in 
the successful attempts Arab states made to remove the confides placed on them by previous 
treaties. More specific arguments on Palestine from Antonius do not offer insight into FO 
thought on Palestine, and Antonius focuses on the circumstances which Britain faced in 
trying to secure future influence in the Middle East. The Palestine Royal Commission of 
1937, commonly known as the Peel Commission, gave early impetus to a Jewish claim for a 
national home in Palestine. The report argued that the “Mandate had become unworkable and 
must be abrogated”12, recommending partition as a solution. As a result of this, Antonius 
argues that “The problem became, in Arab eyes, a problem of self-preservation.”13 Antonius’ 
work helps to understand the motives of the Arab states, and the pressures they were under 
when negotiating with the British. This work provides earlier contextual knowledge needed 
to understand the roots Arab nationalism, which would become a major preoccupation for the 
FO surrounding the Palestine crisis in 1946-47, however it presents no insight into FO 
thought or concerns. Instead, Antonius focuses on the general principle of Britain needing to 
accommodate the Arabs, to retain its desired paramount position in the Middle East.   
 
10 G.Antonius, The Arab Awakening, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1945) p.386 
11 Karsh, Efraim, and Inari Karsh. "Reflections on Arab Nationalism: Review Article." Middle Eastern Studies 32, 
no. 4 (1996), [Accessed Online 20/10/2019] <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283833.> 
12 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry - Appendix IV, Yale Law School, The Avalon Project, Documents in 
Law, History and Diplomacy, [Accessed Online 10/09/20], < avalon.law.yale.edu> 
13 G.Antonius, p.386 
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Other earlier historical work on the topic similarly frame their discussions around the 
general British desire to retain a strong position in the Middle East, and the difficulties the 
British were having in trying to retain this. Bullard, like Antonius, discusses hostility to 
British dominance, and its effects, a notable example being the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
1936, which saw Britain’s military footprint in Egypt reduced to the Suez Canal.14 In 
particular reference to Palestine, Bullard argues that the displaced person crisis resulting from 
the Second World War, helped fuel Zionist demands for a national home in Palestine. He 
argued that Zionists saw the White Paper as “illegal” and that they believed it was “a war 
measure which would be dropped the moment the British Government ceased to need Arab 
support.”15 Bullard believed this view was not shared by the British government and was the 
source to much unrest which led to greater militancy from elements of the Jewish Agency. 
Bullard’s work provides a narrative of the events, without any focus being brought upon 
British strategic concerns regarding Palestine, and provides no FO thought into the matter. 
However, he does touch upon a key issue, being Truman’s calls for allowing a 100,000 
Jewish immigrants entry into Palestine, as well Truman’s loose commitment to funding a 
solution in Palestine.16 A matter which did preoccupy the FO, and engulfed Bevin’s attempts 
towards finding an Anglo-American solution, which drew considerable criticism in the FO.  
An additional earlier contribution to understanding British foreign policy during this 
period is found with A.Fitzsimons. His work is more relevant in the way he puts emphasis on 
the strategic and economic considerations that faced Britain during the Palestine crisis. He 
argues that Britain did not have “great resources of power and exercised influence through 
that complex network of imperial relationships”17 highlighting the importance of Britain’s 
 
14 Bullard.R, Britain And the Middle East, From the earliest times to 1963 (London: Hutchinson University 
Library, 1964), pp.122-3 
15 Ibid., p.149. 
16 Ibid., p.150. 
17 A,Fitzsimons, Empire by Treaty, (London: Earnest Benn Limited, 1965) , p.55 
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existing relationships with Arab states as vital to securing her interests. Fitzsimons also 
argues that “The Independence of India, which had once provided the impetus for British 
establishment in the Middle East, deprived Britain of a major base and the manpower for 
control of the Middle East.”18 Helping demonstrate the difficulties Britain faced in 
maintaining power in the Middle East, “The loss of India meant a precarious British position 
in the Middle East.”19 Fitzsimons strategic considerations of Britain’s position surrounding 
the crisis in Palestine supplies the context to the FO concerns. He also argues that Britain was 
“regarded by many Arabs as the enemy”, and that “The Arab governments were readily 
vulnerable to nationalist agitation and the special positions that Britain sought ran counter to 
Arab nationalist demands.”20 Here Fitzsimons shows an understanding of the effect Arab 
nationalism was having on the Arab states, as they pushed away from British influence. He 
argues that this resulted in a “British cultivation of Arab good will… due to… the value of 
Britain’s Middle East Alliances, bases, and privileges.”21 The importance of Britain trying to 
maintain Arab goodwill is the predominant theme in FO thought during this time. Fitzsimons 
does not look at this matter from the view of the FO particularly, and instead argues these 
matters as general British foreign policy desires, with focus upon Bevin and not the FO. 
A final earlier contribution to the subject comes from Elizabeth Monroe’s widely 
citied work. She argues that Britain faced a severely difficult political landscape during the 
Palestine crisis, due to the rise in Arab nationalism, and as a result British security interests 
were diminished.22 Monroe provides a similar historical context to the previously mentioned 
authors, however her work stands out as most relevant due to some inclusion of the FO in the 
matter. Monroe argues the hopeless of the whole affair for Britain “As the government 
 
18 Ibid., p.54 
19 Ibid., p.54 
20 Fitzsimons, pp.35, 56. 
21 Ibid., p.56 
22 E.Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, (London: The John Hopkins press, 1963) 
14 
 
wriggled this way and that in the toils of a problem that had not altered, except in degree, it 
was accused of taking by sides by two communities battling for survival ; by everyone except 
the Arabs, it was thought to be taking the Arab side.”23 Monroe expresses the hostility of the 
Arabs to Britain over Palestine, and how it engulfed British attempts at treaty renegotiation 
which were vital to maintaining a British position in the Middle East. Monroe goes on to 
highlight how this caused major problems in maintaining a position in Iraq, discussing the 
Iraqi desire “to get rid of the British troops… and how to engineer a Palestine settlement of 
their choice.”24 Monroe argues that it was “under this pressure the Foreign Office pushed 
ahead with arrangements for a new Iraqi Treaty.”25 Monroe’s consideration of the FO was not 
limited to Iraq, and she argues that generally “The Foreign Office representatives in Arab 
capitals were reporting risk to defence plans and oil supplies if there Arabs were 
disregarded.”26 Although she does fail to provide any FO sources to this claim, a similar issue 
with her assessment that “The motive power behind the Foreign Office search for bases came 
from the Imperial General Staff…”27 Therefore, Monroe’s work provides the context to the 
concerns facing the FO and her own assessment of how this motivated the FO. Of all the 
earlier historiography on the subject Monroe’s work provides the most relevant and agreeable 
assessment of the key issues facing the FO, which was treaty renegotiation with the Arab 
States. Although Monroe’s work is somewhat reduced by the lack of actual FO documents to 
support these assessments in any detail. 
During the 1980s, four major contributions to the subject came from Roger Louis, 
Richard Ovendale, Martin Jones and Avi Shlaim. They sought to build upon the 
understanding of British governments motives but sought to pursue this with more 
 
23 Ibid., p.163 
24 Ibid., p.154 
25 E.Monroe, p.163 
26 Ibid., p.163 
27 Ibid., p.157 
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consideration towards the Colonial Office, COS and in certain cases the FO. Louis looks at 
the British position in the Middle East from 1945-51, and similarly covers the key historical 
context of the previous authors. The need for British bases in the Middle East and the 
problems the British had in maintaining rights in Iraq and Egypt, where treaty revision was 
being demanded. Louis considers Bevin’s views and to a limited extent the FO and provides 
greater historical coverage then previous authors in his use of Cabinet, Colonial Office and 
FO documents. He discusses the changing international role Britain was undertaking stating 
“the Empire was not in a state of dissolution but rather transformation. Formal rule would be 
replaced with more modest informal influence…”28 It is under this transformation that Britain 
sought to “remain the dominant regional power” in the Middle East, and therefore Louis 
argues that British priority was to  “support the Arabs and thereby to sustain British power in 
the Middle East.”29 Louis like Monroe places emphasis on the COS demands for bases in the 
Middle East in motivating FO actions, however, like Monroe, Louis does not focus his work 
on the FO. When the FO is included it is primarily focused on its dealings with the Colonial 
Office over provincial autonomy and partition. This contributes to a greater understanding of 
two departments views on provincial autonomy and partition but does not investigate the FO 
views on the wider implications of Palestine. Despite this Louis does provide some FO 
thought into how Palestine involved Anglo-American relations and he argued that a main FO 
motive for American involvement was “to educate the Americans and get them to act 
responsibly on both Palestine and the refugee issue.”30 This is of particular relevance to this 
dissertation, but this assertion is solely based on a Memorandum by the Superintending 
Undersecretary of the Eastern Department, Sir Robert Howe, this did not represent the view 
of most his department, who held large concerns regarding American involvement.31 Overall, 
 
28 R.Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-51, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) p.396. 
29 Ibid., p.396. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., p.392. 
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Louis provides a good narrative of the events in the Middle East, and what key Ministers 
thought. However, his work does not provide a deep understanding of FO thought outside of 
the disagreements between Creech Jones and Bevin, on whether provincial autonomy or 
partition would bring a peaceful solution. Louis’ more recent work repeats a similar line of 
inquiry and highlights the lack of investigation into the FO when he summarizes; “The key to 
the problem of Britain and the end of the Palestine mandate lies in an understanding of the 
thought and motivation of the foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin…. Even though the 
contributions of the prime minster, the chiefs of staff, and the colonial secretary were 
substantial.”32 Louis did not seem to consider the FO efforts as substantial, and argued that 
“Bevin took a strong and independent line… (of the FO).”33 It is perhaps under these 
assertions that led Louis away from deeper insight into FO thought. This makes Louis’ 
generalizations of singular opinions into that of the entire FO perspective somewhat 
understandable and highlights the need for more understanding of the FO thought during this 
time.  
Ovendale provides a similarly authoritative and detailed account of the British 
position in the Middle East during the Palestine crises, and, like Louis, he frames the 
discussions around Cabinet and Bevin but with more FO inclusion. Ovendale goes over the 
familiar historical narrative of the time, arguing of the British need to keep military rights in 
the Middle East,34 and how this was facing being diminished by Egyptian demands for 
British evacuation.35 Ovendale, like Louis and Monroe, considers this in the context of the 
cold war, and uses FO sources to illustrate the concern “that the primary objective of Russia’s 
 
32 R.Louis, “British Imperialism and the End of the Palestine Mandate”, in R.Louis & R.Stookey (eds), The End of 
the Palestine Mandate, (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 1986), p.1. 
33 Ibid., p.7. 
34 Ovendale.R, Britain, The United States, And The End of The Palestine Mandate, (New Hampshire: Royal 
Historical Society Studies in History, 1989), pp. 57, 65, 185, 217-18.  
35 Ibid., p.185 
17 
 
middle eastern policy was to undermine Britain’s position.”36 Ovendale argues that the 
British believed that the Soviet’s would try to take advantage of any Arab resentment, and 
places this consideration, with the need for bases, as the prime motivator for British policy. 
Ovendale therefore argues that the FO believed that “Repercussions of a policy unfavorable 
to the Arabs were likely to be widespread.”37 Ovendale’s consideration of the FO perspective 
is insightful however it has limitations being based primarily on views of C.W. Baxter (Head 
of the Eastern Department) and Harold Beeley (Eastern Department and adviser to Bevin) 
and their inclusion is in reference to the FO views on partition and provincial autonomy. 
Therefore, a focus on the differences in FO thought in dealing with the United States and 
Arabs is only a minor consideration in a wider narrative framed around the British 
government and COS.  Furthermore, Ovendale is at times careless on providing notions of 
representative FO thought, such as in his suggestion that “the Foreign Office developed an 
idea which Bevin claimed to be his own: Britain should aim at establishing a Palestine state 
under an Arab King which might eventually lead to a federation with the other Arab states in 
Levant.”38 This idea will come under discussion in chapter two’s focus on Transjordan. 
However, it is worth noting that this was not a policy that gained any traction and was 
disposed of almost immediately. Ovendale does provide greater FO insight into this topic 
then previous works on Britain and withdrawal, however like Louis there is limited use of FO 
documents, and they are used to make significant assertions.  Overall, this is a continuation in 
the written history of the subject, to focus on the historical native, framed around Bevin and 
Cabinet, with limited FO inclusion. Where FO insight is included it is at times 
misrepresented, by the arguments of the few being applied to the many. This demonstrates 
 
36 Ibid., p.186 
37 Ibid., p.65 
38 Ibid., p.85 
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the need for more FO documents to be explored to uncover a more reflective account of what 
the FO thought and did during Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine.  
The most notable work on this topic is by Martin Jones, who published his study in 
between Ovendale’s and Louis’ first and seconds books. Jones focus is not on the context of 
the time, and instead on the views of Bevin, the Cabinet, the COS, the FO, and the Colonial 
Office. Unlike Monroe, Fitzsimons, Ovendale and Louis, Jones aimed to explain why 
peaceful resolution in Palestine was not found, and where the blame was to be laid among the 
British participants. Jones has clear contempt for the FO, who he argues was obsessed with 
opposing any solution that was not found with the Arabs and their approval. He believed 
because of this there was “Vigorous opposition from the Foreign Office” to prevent an 
Anglo-American solution, or a British mediated solution with the Jewish Agency, stating that 
the FO was “battling to stop Partition”.39 Jones ultimately provides an unprecedented attack 
on the FO who he argued was the reason for the failure of British policy in Palestine. He 
believed that the FO, under the leadership of the Eastern Department engaged in an “ancient 
preference for dealing with ‘the Arab world’ as a whole”40 and because of this thwarted the 
Anglo-American initiative. Jones believes this was with the “The single-minded intent of the 
Foreign Office to press ahead with the London Conference” as the solution and “the 
motivation was, as always, the concern to be seen to be doing the right thing by the Arab 
world.”41 Jones’ work uses a range of FO sources, and contributes to the two key areas of this 
study’s focus, the FO views on American involvement and maintaining Arab goodwill. What 
Jones’ history fails to do, is to provide balance. His focus on discrediting the FO to attribute 
blame fails to truly consider the wider context. The difficulties in the Anglo-American 
initiative will be explored in the next chapter, but it is worth noting that Truman’s insistence 
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on scraping the White Paper and his push for 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine 
without any negotiation, was a major handicap to Bevin’s Anglo-American initiative. Also, 
of particular importance for the second chapter in this study, Jones attributes all FO sympathy 
to the Arabs as an irrational obsession with dealing with them on traditionally favorable 
terms, and collectively. He fails to consider the significance of Arab nationalism, and the 
domestic pressure the Arab states were under to stop Palestine being divided. This resulted in 
a failure to appreciate the FO consideration of this pressure and the limited pressure the FO 
could apply to the Arab States. Some Arab states were already calling for British evacuation 
and treaty revision, and there was an overall rejection of western imperialism. Under these 
circumstances there was little pressure the FO could bring upon the Arab states, and even less 
if Britain was to succeed in maintaining a military presence in the Middle East after the crisis 
in Palestine.  
A final contribution from the 1980’s comes from Avi Shlaim. His study focuses on 
the relationship between Abdullah and the Zionists working in Palestine towards a Jewish 
state. Shlaim argues that Abdullah was “a very welcome and important ally to the Jewish 
Agency”42,  and that there was significant collusion between the two to carve up Palestine. 
Shlaim argues this was motivated by Abdullah’s territorial ambitions, his estrangement from 
the other Arab states, as well as his dependence on Britain. His study uses a wide range of 
American, British and Israeli archival sources to uncover this collusion, and includes some 
FO thought surrounding Abdullah’s attempts to gain British endorsement for annexation of 
part of Palestine. The most relevant of these inclusions was in the form of reservations from 
within the FO of publicly endorsing Abdullah’s plans, as well as considerations of the 
potential benefits of an enlarged Transjordan. Bevin’s private endorsement of Abdullah plans 
is central to Shlaim’s inclusion of the British position; however, he ultimately concludes that 
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a tripartite between Britain, Abdullah and the Jewish Agency was not possible. This was due 
to Jewish mistrust of the mandatory power, as well as the lack of a formal British 
commitment to Abdullah’s aims. Shlaim’s work provides large insights into the relationship 
between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency during the British withdrawal form Palestine, 
however FO thought is a lesser consideration. 
The most recent historiography since the 1980s comes from Iian Pappe, Charles 
Smith and D.K.Fieldhouse. Pappe provides greater FO insight then previous historians in the 
relationship between Britain and the Emir of Transjordan, King Abdullah, one of the three 
key Arab States focused on in this paper. Britain and Transjordan had a unique relationship 
and Pappe contributes to understanding the motives and attitude of a key member of the 
British Diplomatic Service, Alec Kirkbride the British Ambassador to Transjordan. Kirkbride 
defended Transjordan’s interests, and its value to Britain as an ally. Pappe argues that, 
“British policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and to a lesser extent towards the Middle 
East as a whole was based on a strong Anglo-Transjordan alliance.”43 This was because 
British strategic considerations were facing major setbacks over the loss of Palestine, during a 
time when rights in Iraq and Egypt were also being rejected, “Britain is putting all its egg in 
one basket since all other baskets are unwilling to accommodate our eggs.”44 The importance 
of Transjordan in FO thought was due to the large influence Britain held there. Britain had 
freedom of movement in wartime, and financed, trained, and even supplied officers to the 
Arab Legion. Pappe believed that “Britain’s dominant role in Transjordan was due to Sir 
Alec Kirkbride’s immense influence on King Abdullah... Britain could rely, unhesitatingly, 
on Transjordan’s loyalty and cooperation.”45 Pappe does not provide wider FO thought on the 
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Palestine crisis, however he does discuss Kirkbride’s desire to see Abdullah annex part of 
Palestine in the event of partition, a subject of particular relevance to this study. The 
usefulness of Pappe’s account of the relationship between Abdullah and Kirkbride is of 
limited value, due to the focus being on only one person within the FO. Despite this 
Kirkbride is a key figure in the FO and the British withdrawal from Palestine, as he sought to 
encourage a British-Transjordan agreement to help realize Abdullah ambitions, and widen 
British military rights. This is particularly useful as the FO response to these calls, helps to 
illustrate the overall reluctance to divide Arab opinion, and goodwill.  
Charles Smith also contributes to modern history regarding the withdrawal from 
Palestine, and his works focuses on the Arab and Jewish struggle to obtain their desired 
futures. Smith’s dedication to understanding the events which led to the creation of Israel is 
absent for the most part of British considerations. The usefulness of his work in 
understanding British motives is reduced to the desires of Bevin. He argues that “British 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s cardinal concern from 1945 to 1948 was the security of 
British strategic interests in the Middle East and Asia”46 and his main reference to British 
concerns is framed around “The question (which) was where British troops could be 
stationed.”47 Smith provides a greater history of the dynamics of the Jewish Agency, and 
Arab organizations in Palestine such as the Mufti. His history does consider some British 
perspectives, such Bevin’s and Attlee’s (The British Prime Minster) concerns of the impact 
Palestine could have on Anglo-American relations. However, British considerations are brief 
and are there to provide context, which lack any consideration of the Foreign Office.  
The final recent history of events, is provided by D.K. Fieldhouse. His work looks at 
the Middle East as a whole and how the mandate systems there failed the Arab States. It is in 
 




these failures he argues Arab Nationalism rose, and resulted in rejection of western 
imperialism, demonstrated by Egypt’s call for the evacuation of British troops and Iraq’s 
failure to ratify treaty revision. Fieldhouse argues that “The British government regarded 
Palestine as critical for the security of its control of Egypt, itself vital for the route to India 
and the East”48 and argues that British policy was firmly in support of the White Paper, until 
its eventual referral of the matter to the United Nations. Fieldhouse argues that the COS 
viewed “Palestine as essential to British strategic positions in the Middle East”49 and that 
“The British defence establishment never viewed the evacuation of Palestine as an acceptable 
option…”50 A main issue in Fieldhouse’s work is the lack of any FO and Colonial Office 
sources, which fail to provide a full understanding of the various views in the British 
establishment. Like Monroe and Fitzsimons, Fieldhouse generalizes the British view as 
united, and frames it around Bevin and Attlee, using COS concerns to reinforce these claims.  
There is a lack of any archival material and as a result his contribution does not provide any 
understanding to the perspectives of the officials in the FO.  
Overall, there is a large number of publications which look at the British position in 
the Middle East during the 1940s and the effect Palestine had on Britain’s relations with the 
United States and the Arab States. Earlier historiography such as, Antonius, Bullard, 
Fitzsimons and Monroe provide historical context to the subject, the British attempts to 
maintain a position in the Middle East and the difficulties they had in doing so, due to Arab 
calls for less or no further British interference. These earlier works do not look into FO 
thought, however, they do contribute to a deeper understanding of the situation in the Middle 
East and pressures the British government faced.  Louis and Ovendale later provide a more 
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detailed narratives of events, which are based on more archival material, including some use 
FO sources. Despite this both look at the British perspectives primarily from the view of 
Bevin, Attlee, the Cabinet and the demands of the COS. Louis justifies this focus due to the 
dominant hold Bevin had over British Foreign policy, and Ovendale failed to use enough FO 
material which resulted in false assertions. Martin uses far more FO material then Louis and 
Ovendale, however his work is dedicated to attributing blame for the failure to find a 
solution, and as a result he focuses on criticizing the FO in every manner, without fully 
considering the pressures of Arab nationalism and the problems the United States created in 
finding resolution. More recent histories such as Pappe provide focus to the contribution of 
Kirkbride on British-Transjordan relations, which is a key consideration in FO thought, 
although Pappe’s work is limited to only one individual in the FO.  Smith and Fieldhosue, 
both contribute to understanding the concerns of the Arabs and Jews at the time, and how the 
mandate system failed the Arab States, with the latter arguing resulted in a rejection of 
western imperialism. However, both these works do not contribute to understanding FO 
thought on the matter. Instead, they continue the trend of focusing on the British withdrawal 
from Palestine from the point of view of the British government and for the most part Bevin. 
Overall, there is a clear gap in the historiography for a specific focus on understanding the 
FO perspective on the British withdrawal from Palestine. This study aims to include a greater 
range and use of FO sources, to investigate where there was division and consensus within 
the FO, and what advice they provided to government to try and address their concerns. The 
FO perspective will be considered in the context of the Cold War, and FO policy in the 
Middle East during these years is included. This focuses on the rise of Arab nationalism and 
the various FO attempts at treaty renegotiation with Arab states, which was deemed essential 




A FO perspective on the United States and the British Withdrawal from Palestine 
The crisis in Palestine and the coming end of the British mandate occurred during the start of 
the Cold War. The Soviet Union occupied the majority of Eastern Europe and was perceived 
as a major threat to the security of the remaining democracies. As a result, Anglo-American 
cooperation was a priority for both nations. The Middle East was vital to maintaining British 
security, and the US shared the belief that Soviet penetration into the Middle East would 
severely go against the interests of both nations. Therefore, the UK and the US sought to 
coordinate their policies in the Middle East. Bevin championed an Anglo-American solution 
to the Palestine crisis in accordance with this spirit. The FO did not oppose the necessary 
political and military alliance with the United States, despite this fact, the FO was vocal and 
persistent in opposition to Truman’s attempts influence the Palestine crisis, which most in the 
FO perceived as contrary to British strategic interests in the Middle East. The UK had a long 
history of direct involvement and presence in the Middle East, and its existing rights were 
primarily with Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan. The United States did not share these rights, nor 
did it have the rapport with the various Arab regimes that Britain did. As a result, the FO was 
concerned of alienating it regional allies, in favour of the US which had little influence in the 
Middle East. Truman, on the other hand, faced large domestic pressure for a Jewish national 
home in Palestine, something which the Arabs rejected as unjust. These complications made 
Bevin’s push for an Anglo-American solution less probable, and his enthusiasm was not 
shared within his own department. During this period, the FO remained mostly consistent in 
its warnings against Truman’s desires, which are best understood during two phases. The first 
was the rise and fall of the Anglo-American initiative, which saw intensive negotiation 
between the Americans and British, and was ultimately rejected by Truman. The second 
phase was reduced US involvement during the London Conference, with the notable 
exception of Truman’s Yom Kippur statement. During these two phases the FO remained 
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united, for the most part, against accommodating the Americans at the expense of Arabs. This 
perspective was led by Beeley and Baxter and found support from the Secretary to Cabinet 
and Chairman of Official Committee on Palestine, Norman Brook. Who condemned the 
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommendations, arguing against partition and of an 
Arab backlash if greater Jewish immigration was permitted.51 Some deviation from this 
overall view did occur during the first phase, which was led by Howe and Sargent. During the 
second phase this was led by the British Ambassador to the US, Lord Inverchapel. The 
differences in opinion these individuals held will be explored, and what effect it had on a 
mostly united FO perspective will be assessed.  
The process that led to the British withdrawal from Palestine saw frequent American 
involvement. This was met in Britain with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Bevin sought 
American cooperation globally, desiring a united front against the growing influence of the 
Soviet Union. This desire was apparent in his substantial efforts to find an Anglo-American 
solution to the British withdrawal from Palestine. The FO had significant concerns regarding 
American involvement and was weary of sacrificing Arab goodwill to appease American 
policy desires. During the Potsdam Conference 17 July to 2 August 1945 Truman told 
Churchill that he hoped “that the British Government may find it possible without delay to 
take steps to lift the restrictions of the White Paper on Jewish immigration in Palestine.”52 
Truman’s desire to scrap the White Paper and allow large scale Jewish immigration into 
Palestine was also supported by the Harrison Report. This report was by Earl Grant Harrison 
(American representative on the Intergovernmental Commission on Refugees) and criticized 
the conditions displaced people in Europe faced stating “We appear to be treating the Jews as 
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the Nazis treated them except that we do not exterminate them”53 and recommended to 
Truman that 100,000 displaced persons should immediately be allowed entry to Palestine. 
Truman’s initial desire for Jewish immigration into Palestine as a partial solution to the 
displaced persons crisis and the Harrison Report led to greater American involvement in 
Palestine and a desire to seek a solution with Britain. Truman wrote to Attlee requesting that 
“special attention”54 be drawn to the 100,000-recommendation laid out by Harrison upon his 
succession as the British Prime Minster.  
The FO immediately began to raise concerns over the American desire to scrap the 
White Paper and allow large scale Jewish immigration.  On 11 July 1945, Baxter argued that: 
“The existence of a Jewish State would provide a source of conflict which would inevitably 
continue to have a deplorable effect on Anglo-Arab relations”55 and that once the White 
Paper’s immigration limits had expired, another 100,000 would prevent the safeguarding of 
British interests in the region due to Arab reactions. Beeley agreed with this argument and 
argued that another 100,000 “would not be believed”56, warning against going beyond the 
White Paper. These concerns were repeated in the British Middle Eastern embassies, Sir 
Walter Smart (British Cairo Embassy) argued that Truman’s calls for more Jewish 
immigration have “forced the pace here” and he believed that “we should impress on the 
United States Government that, unless they are careful, they will start a fire here which we 
shall have to put out at considerable sacrifice to ourselves.”57 The Eastern Department had 
therefore taken an immediate, and unified position against Truman’s calls to scrap the White 
Paper and allow 100,000 Jewish immigrants entry into Palestine. This opposition was 
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founded on the negative impact it would have on Britain’s relations with its key regional 
allies such as Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan. These Arab states were essential to maintaining 
British military power in the region and Britain’s ‘paramount position’ in the Middle East. 
This was outlined as vital to British security and was part of Britain’s ‘three pillar strategy’, 
which was formed in the post-Second World War defence review.58 Any large-scale Jewish 
immigration from the FO perspective would damage ties with the Arabs and weaken Britain’s 
position in the Middle East.  
FO opposition to involving the United States and permitting entry of 100,000 Jewish 
peoples into Palestine did not prevent Bevin from trying to pursue a cooperative approach 
with the United States on the matter of Palestine. On 15 October 1945, Bevin announced in 
the British Parliament the creation of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry. This 
committee was a joint Anglo-American body, that was tasked “To examine political, 
economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish 
immigration and settlement” and to investigate the position of Jews in Europe, as well as 
consult Jews and Arabs on the problems in Palestine, with the ability to provide joint 
recommendations to the UK and US governments.59 Bevin saw this as way to reduce 
American pressure and include them in delivering a solution. He argued that it was “essential 
to take steps to allay the agitation in the United States which was poisoning our relations.”60 
The Cabinet agreed stating “The United States will thus be placed in the position of sharing 
the responsibility of the policy which she advocates. She will no longer be able to play the 
part of irresponsible critic.”61 It was clear that there was frustration in the British Cabinet at 
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the consistent public American criticism and demands, without being involved or sharing the 
responsibility of the matter. The start of this Anglo-American initiative sought to elevate 
American pressure and enable Britain and the United States to cooperate on finding a joint 
solution to the issues.  
The start of this cooperation was not entirely opposed by the FO. Sargent and Howe, 
like Bevin, sought to involve the United States.  Howe wrote to Bevin suggesting for a “fresh 
approach… with the object of ensuring that the United States, who now criticize us 
irresponsibly, should assume a share of the responsibility for the settlement.”62 This telegram 
was cowritten with Sargent, who also telegraphed Bevin stating that he believed this idea  
could be used in talks “if you think fit”.63 Despite the concerns in the Eastern Department 
against American involvement and warnings of agitating the Arabs if Britain did so, Howe 
chose to disregard Beeley, Baxter and Smart and propose a shared vision with Sargent which 
supported Bevin’s desire for an Anglo-American solution. Sargent and Howe believed if they 
could involve the Americans in a solution, it would reduce their criticism because they would 
be forced into sharing the burden of any solution.  
Beeley and Baxter did not share the views of Sargent and Howe and warned that the 
Anglo-American Committee “would not provide a substitute for the short-term policy which 
the Cabinet had previously put into effect. Nor could it take the place of the trusteeship 
agreement for Palestine, which will eventually have to be concluded.”64 This short-term 
policy was to negotiate a trusteeship agreement with Palestine and the Arab states, for 
submission to the United Nations for approval. Beeley went on to argue that “The findings of 
an Anglo-American commission, while they might be fitted into this process and might play a 
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part in determining the character of the trusteeship agreement would not eliminate either of 
these stages.”65 This demonstrates apprehension from Beeley and Baxter that the Anglo-
American committee could interfere with gaining Arab support for a trusteeship agreement, 
without any potential gain. Howe defended the position that he and Sargent had taken, stating 
that the Anglo-American initiative did not go against these aims, and that it could be “fitted 
into the process… by being inserted between the adoption of the short-policy and the 
negotiation of a trusteeship agreement.”66 The FO was therefore divided, with Sargent and 
Howe supporting Bevin in seeking Anglo-American cooperation, and hoping to involve the 
United States in a solution. The concerns of Baxter, Beeley and Smart were not completely 
discarded by Howe, who considered that the proposal could leave Britain open to 
“insuperable” objections from Arab states, who would see Britain as giving in to US pressure 
at the expense of Palestinian Arabs.67 Furthermore, while the Anglo-American Committee of 
Inquiry was underway Howe was involved in discussions with J.M.Martin (Assistant 
Undersecretary at Colonial Office) about alternative solutions to resolve the problems. Martin 
was concerned that the committee might recommend partition “without fully realizing the 
repercussion elsewhere”68and felt that the only viable alternative was a provincial autonomy 
scheme. This would keep Palestine undivided and allow self-rule in the Jewish and Arab 
majority areas. The discussions of Martin and Howe developed in to an inter-departmental 
meeting between the FO and Colonial Office. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Chairman of the FO 
Middle Eastern Committee) and Baxter discussed the matter with Martin and Sir Douglas 
Harris (Colonial Office). No favoured alternative was found. Baxter and Howe both 
expressed restraint in making any recommendations to the committee in case they were to 
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“pronounced against it”69, as this could rule out a FO and Colonial Office solution.  Harris 
summarized that “neither Sir Kinahan nor Mr. Baxter were greatly interested in the provincial 
autonomy scheme except in so far as its presentation might afford an opportunity for getting 
the white paper policy in the picture again.”70 Baxter and Kinhan were willing to potentially 
compromise with the Colonial Office on accepting their provincial autonomy scheme in order 
to prevent American policy desires gaining traction with the British government. Cooperation 
between the FO and Colonial Office during this period was limited due to the FO being 
opposed to deviating from the White Paper. The Colonial Office did not share this 
commitment and was quick to adopt provincial autonomy as a solution, which Harris 
promoted as a solution after the Harrison Report. It was only during October 1945 that FO 
officials started to seriously consider provincial autonomy as necessary compromise, hoping 
it could be a temporary solution which would limit further American demands that would 
agitate the Arabs.  
Howe supported Sargent in a ‘fresh approach’ in dealing with the United States in a 
collaborative matter, but he was also involved in his department’s discussions about 
alternatives. He shared the Eastern Department’s concerns, not wishing to alienate the 
Arabs’.71 Baxter, Beeley, Smith and Sir Kinahan, were so concerned with maintaining Arab 
goodwill they sought to minimize American involvement. They saw Truman’s calls for 
100,000 Jewish immigrants and scrapping the White Paper as destructive to their own policy 
goals and doubted the ability of the Anglo-American Committee to find a reasonable 
solution.72 Howe shared some of these concerns, but was in concurrence with Sargent, who 
supported Bevin’s Anglo-American initiative. In order to share the burden of any 
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recommended solution, remove the United States as a spectating critic, limiting American 
agitation, and therefore improve Anglo-American ties. Between July 1945 and March 1946, 
FO concern about American involvement and rejection of allowing 100,000 Jews into 
Palestine had not been reduced. Overall, the Eastern Department was still persistent in the 
damage Anglo-American cooperation could have on British ties with the Arab states, vital to 
the aims of the Colonial Office and British military interests. Sargent supported Bevin in 
pursing an Anglo-American initiative and Howe to a lesser extent, however both still 
sympathized with the concerns of the Eastern Department. The FO’s perspective had changed 
little during this time, and the involvement of Sargent and Howe in supporting an Anglo-
American initiative was retrospective. Bevin had already decided to press on with seeking a 
solution with the United States, even against clear warnings from his department.  
The report of The Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry played a significant part in 
reestablishing FO opposition to an Anglo-American initiative and provided impetus in 
finding their own alternative. On 20 April 1946, the Anglo-American Committee’s final 
report recommended that 100,000 immigrations certificates for Jewish people in Europe “be 
authorized immediately for the admission into Palestine” and that “immigration be pushed 
forward as rapidly as conditions will permit”.73 It also called for a state in which neither the 
Arabs nor the Jews dominated, and that Palestine should be organised under a United Nations  
Trusteeship once the British Mandate expired. At Cabinet level the implications and viability 
of the report was discussed. Brook provided a report on the committee’s recommendations. 
Brook argued that the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommendations “would have 
a disastrous effect on our position in the Middle East” and that it would not even “silence 
Zionist clamor in the United States.”74 This report was submitted to the Defence Committee 
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for discussion and Thomas Wikeley (Eastern Department) sent Bevin a brief in which he 
argued that the Anglo-American committee recommendations were unfair on the Arabs, who 
“lose nearly all along the line”,  but Wikeley still believed it was “essential” for American 
cooperation.75 Wikeley also stressed that the disarming of illegal Jewish organizations be a 
precondition for any consideration of more immigration, a matter which Truman wanted 
unconditionally and immediately. Wikeley warnings against the recommendations of the 
Anglo-American Committee were a repetition of the concerns Baxter, Beeley, Smith, and Sir 
Kinahan held throughout 1945. That American involvement and Truman’s calls for 
permitting 100,000 Jews entry into Palestine would severely damage Britain’s standing in the 
Arab world if these recommendations were implemented. Nevile Butler (Superintending 
Undersecretary of the North American Department) wrote to Howe suggesting that the FO 
reject the report, and that it would not antagonize the US significantly “if we play our hand 
well”.76 Butler believed that Britain could not accept allowing 100,000 Jews into Palestine 
without United Nations’ approval, which would also be beneficial for Anglo-Arab relations. 
Beeley agreed with the note and wrote “A most useful paper. Keep it available for use during 
the Secretary of State’s discussions in Pairs (for the Paris Peace Conference).”77 This shows 
that the FO was in agreement in the Eastern and North American Department and is evidence 
that the report had strengthened FO opposition to accommodating American demands, for 
permitting 100,000 Jews entry into Palestine and implementing the Anglo-American 
Committee’s report.  
The Morrison-Grady discussions were an attempt for British and American experts to 
propose a plan to implement the recommendations from the Anglo-American Committee. 
These negotiations started 31 July 1946 and were led by Herbert Morrison (British Deputy 
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Prime Minister) and Henry F. Grady (American State Department). It was during these 
discussions that Bevin’s desires for Anglo-American cooperation started to face multiple 
setbacks, and events in Palestine started to become bloodier. During this time the North 
American Department warned of Truman’s complacency over the 100,000 being accepted by 
the British, and the Eastern Department continued to warn of the damage American 
involvement was going to have on Britain’s entire position in the Middle East. At the same 
time the FO started to cooperate with the Colonial Office on the idea of provincial autonomy, 
which was to be used as the British position in discussions with Grady. On 30 April 1946, 
when the Anglo-American Committee published its report, Truman gave a press statement 
rejecting the White Paper and praising the inclusion of his 100,000 suggestion by the Anglo-
American Committee.78 Francis Williams, the Downing Street Press Secretary at the time 
wrote that this “Threw Bevin into one of the blackest rages I ever saw him in”.79 This was a 
poor start to the workings out of the Anglo-American initiative, and shows the difference in 
views between the two governments as to the finality of the Anglo-American committee 
recommendations. Inverchapel reported that he would “not be surprised at all” if Truman kept 
insisting on the 100,000 as an accepted precondition for finding a mutual solution.80 
Inverchapel reported from talks with James Byrnes, the United States Secretary of State, that 
“it is quite apparent that despite all we have said, he (Truman) takes for granted admission of 
the 100,000 as an immediate step.”81 Sargent concurred and wrote to Attlee stating that it was 
“clear the two governments still have different ideas as to the purpose of these talks.”82 The 
difficulty in cooperating with the United States on an acceptable solution to the British was 
becoming clear in the North American Department, and to Sargent. In the Eastern 
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Department further repetition of the repercussions of involving and ceding to American 
pressures continued, warning of the dire effect it was having, and would continue to have on 
the British position among the Arab States. From Lebanon, Terence Shone (British Minister 
in Beirut) wrote that “American support of Zionism is poising Arab thought” and that the 
“Arabs cannot stand by supine.”83 What was most concerning to Shone and summarized the 
view of his colleagues in the Eastern Department, was the fact that Britain was sharing the 
blame in Arab circles,  
There is no doubt that the Arab public opinion lays a large measure of responsibility 
for the (enquiries) recommendations on the Americans… but the press is little, if any, 
less bitter against us, not least for having brought the United States into the question.84 
Further Arab criticism for involving the United States came from Brigadier Iltyd Nicholl 
Clayton (British Minister in Cairo) who warned that the Arab’s perceived Britain as 
providing concessions to the United States over Palestine, in return for a loan which the 
British were negotiating with the Americans. Clayton believed that this view was “almost 
universally held in the Middle East”.85 Concerns in the Eastern Department were further 
exacerbated by the Arab League meeting in June 1946. Here the Arab League created the 
Palestine Committee and provided a fund for Palestine. There was concern that the Arabs 
may consider boycotting Anglo-American interests, and push for referral to the United 
Nations. This would involve the Soviets in a solution and was undesired by the British and 
American governments. The Eastern Department was primary concerned with the diplomatic 
repercussions from Arab states, when working with the United States. From Truman’s initial 
desire to scrap the White Paper in July 1945, to the Morrison-Grady negotiations in July 
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1946, the Eastern Department was consistent and nearly unanimously against American 
involvement in Palestine. These concerns were being understood in the North American 
Department and Butler suggested rejecting the recommendations from the Anglo-American 
Committee, and Inverchapel warned of American complacency and the gulf between the two 
governments. These concerns occasionally met with Sargent’s agreement, who like Bevin 
became frustrated with Truman and American actions during the negotiations. Despite all the 
concerns coming from the FO, Bevin and Attlee still sought to pursue a solution with the 
United States, which Sargent went along with as part of the wider Anglo-American strategic 
alliance in the face of the Soviet Union. Sargent like Bevin seemed more concerned with 
matters in Europe then the Middle East, therefore maintaining a coordinated foreign policy 
with the United States was important, and this meant that Bevin and Sargent were motivated 
to try and hear American concerns and work towards a mutually agreeable solution.   
The final phase in the ending of the Anglo-American initiative started with the 
Colonial Office drawing up plans for provincial autonomy. The FO became involved in these 
discussions, and eventually they were accepted by Bevin as the only viable solution for 
Morrison to purse with Grady. This development in the British position came from 
impatience and frustration. From April- July 1946 the situation in Palestine was becoming 
more dangerous for the British, and Jewish terrorist activity was costing the British more 
resources than previously, as well as lives. On 10 June, Jewish terrorists damaged trains, 
while on 16-17 June eight road and railways bridges were damaged.86 On 18 June, six British 
officers were kidnapped,87 and on 22 July part of the King David Hotel was blow up, with the 
loss of eighty-eight British lives. As well as these attacks, illegal Jewish immigration was 
rising, from below 1,000 in April to 1,663 in June and 1,758 in July,88 concern was mounting 
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that the situation would spiral further. Costing more British resources and causing greater 
resentment from the Arabs, because of Britain’s failure to fulfill her obligations under the 
White Paper. These pressures were not reserved to Eastern Department thought, and the 
British Cabinet had grown impatient and skeptical at Bevin’s Anglo-American initiative, the 
events in Palestine lead to the Cabinet requesting the Colonial Office to find an alternative.   
These events were discussed in Cabinet by George Hall (Colonial Secretary) while 
Bevin was away for talks in Paris. Hall was asked to present a paper on the Anglo-American 
report and the difficulties likely to come from trying to implement, and “outline alternative 
policies which might be adopted”.89 In response Hall warned the Cabinet that if the Anglo-
American recommendations were implemented, they “may be expected to lead to an Arab 
rising in Palestine” and also warned that the Jewish Agency would not accept anything short 
of a Jewish state in Palestine.90 Hall went on to say these outcomes “would have a disastrous 
effect on Great Britain’s position in the Middle East”.91 Hall then concluded that 
implementing the Anglo-American Committee’s recommendations would “imperil our 
position” in the Middle East, “involve us in military and financial commitments beyond our 
capacity” and that the Committee recommendations “taken as a whole, are unworkable.”92 
Hall then presented the Cabinet with provincial autonomy as a alternative solution.  This idea 
had been developed by the Colonial Office during 1945 and was discarded by Bevin and the 
government while attempts were made for an Anglo-American solution.  While Bevin was 
still in Paris, the Colonial Office asked the FO to endorse the provincial autonomy scheme. 
This led to inter-department discussions on the matter. Clayton argued that the Jewish 
Agency may accept provincial autonomy, but foresaw it gaining “a very poor reception”93 
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with the Arabs. Beeley agreed that “Clayton is probably right” and that “at first sight the 
Arabs will find the scheme of provincial autonomy less attractive then partition.” However 
Beeley went on to argue that provincial autonomy could be more advantageous for the Arabs, 
“as no part of Palestine is irrevocably lost to the Arabs… if events show that the Jews will 
never overtake the Arabs in numbers, a time may come when some sort of federation is 
advantageous.”94 By the end of July 1946, the FO was therefore reluctant to support 
provincial autonomy, but did not reject it, and had no solution of its own, and was still hoping 
for some form of Trusteeship to be agreed with the Arabs, without a Jewish state. The FO had 
little time to discuss the matter fully as Brook met Bevin in Paris and presented the Colonial  
Office scheme, to which he agreed “he was ready to explore” and argued that “it should be 
discussed with the American officials.”95 These developments did not undo the Anglo-
American initiative Bevin was still advocating, as he sought to include them in discussions 
with Grady. The Colonial Office proposal for an alternative would therefore be used as a 
negotiating position for the British to discuss with the Americans as a possible solution. The 
FO did not endorse Hall’s proposal enthusiastically, nor did it reject it. Hall’s warning against 
agitating the Arabs and damaging Britain’s standing among the Arab states was a shared 
concern for the FO. During these developments the FO warnings continued to come from the 
Middle East, with Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird (British Minister in Iraq) reporting on the 
dangers of allowing mass Jewish immigration, something that Bevin “did not feel able to 
oppose”.96 Baxter highlighted his departments warnings, writing that the views Stonehewer-
Bird expressed were “important”.97 The FO continued its previous warnings against agitating 
the Arabs and alienating Britain in the Middle East while the Harrison-Grady discussions 
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continued. The FO position did not change during this time, and it remained opposed to 
giving into American pressure, and allowing 100,000 Jewish immigrants entry into Palestine.  
During July, while Bevin was in Paris, the FO reluctantly agreed to Hall’s plan for 
provincial anatomy. Although Clayton along with Baxter and Stonehewer-Bird continued to 
warn against agitating the Arabs further, Beeley provided some evidence that the FO could 
accept provincial autonomy more enthusiastically, although he still viewed it as an 
intermediate solution, which the Arabs could reject later if they wished to. What is noticeable 
during these developments is that the FO did not provide any alternative to Bevin’s Anglo-
American initiative, nor against Hall’s alternative proposal from the Colonial Office, despite 
providing clear and consistent warnings at upsetting the Arabs in favour of reaching 
accommodation with the United States. It was not until the creation of the London 
Conference that the FO would pursue a more active role in trying to find an alternative 
solution, with the Arabs and not the Americans as the main consideration in working out a 
solution.  
The FO was released of it concerns of direct American involvement prejudicing its 
negotiations with the Arabs when the end of the Anglo-American initiative occurred. In a 
meeting on 30 July, the US Deputy Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, informed Inverchapel 
that the “President has regretfully decided he is unable to accept the recommended plan” and 
that “He hopes further study might produce a plan which would be likely of public 
acceptance in this country.”98 The plan received negative reactions in the American press, 
and the President was directly lobbied over the matter. Grady was portrayed as giving into the 
British position and accepting provincial autonomy, which the Jewish Agency would not 
accept. By 8 August 1946, Truman had informed Attlee that “that I do not feel able in present 
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circumstances to accept the plan proposed as a joint Anglo-American plan.”99 The reasons 
behind the sudden rejection of the Anglo-American initiative, after all the negotiations, is 
beyond the scope of this chapter,100 but it was now clear that the Anglo-American initiative 
was buried, and Truman told Attlee that he hoped the coming London Conference would 
provide a solution which “can obtain necessary support in this country and in Congress so 
that we can give effective financial help and moral support”.101 This was rebuffed by Attlee 
who wrote “… any solution must, as matter stand, be one which we can put into effect with 
our resources alone.”102 Inverchapel warned that continuing to find a solution without 
American involvement would create an “extremely unfortunate impression” in the United 
States, despite this concern it was clear that Attlee was now willing to use the London 
Conference for a British lead mediation of the issue, one which Eastern Department would 
have welcomed. It reduced the pressure of allowing 100,000 Jewish immigrants entry to 
Palestine and in implementing the Anglo-American Committee recommendations. This 
meant that discussions with the Arabs could commence at the London Conference without 
the need to accommodate the United States. An issue the Eastern Department had 
consistently argued would reduce Britain’s standing in the Middle East and isolate Britain 
from its regional allies.  
The rise and fall of Bevin’s desired Anglo-American solution was not supported by 
the FO overall. Truman’s calls to scrap the White Paper and heed the Harrison Report’s 
recommendation for 100,000 Jewish immigrants entry into Palestine was met with alarm in 
the FO in July 1945, with Baxter Beeley and Smart warning of disastrous consequences. The 
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Cabinet’s desire to share the burden with the United States and remove them as a critical 
spectator was championed by Bevin, and it was only in October 1945 when Howe agreed 
with a fresh approach of involving the US, that was supported by Sargent. This was met with 
immediate apprehension by Beeley and Baxter, who believed it would effectively kill any 
aspirations for a British trusteeship with continued military rights, something the COS argued 
was essential to maintaining British security. Howe’s support for a fresh approach was 
limited and he still shared the concerns of his Eastern Department colleagues, around 
agitating the Arab and reducing Britain’s position in the Middle East. This is shown when he 
agreed to inter-department discussions with the Colonial Office on alternatives, where 
Kinahan and Baxter made efforts to find a British solution to the matter. It was therefore clear 
that even at the start of the Anglo-American initiative, the FO was mostly in opposition to 
accommodating the United States over the Arabs. Bevin’s desire for an Anglo-American 
solution was only backed fully by Sargent, who was mostly absent from his department 
concerns.  
Brook’s damming report on the Anglo-American Committee’s recommendations 
helped fuel even more unity, with Wikeley condemning the calls for 100,000 and arguing 
against the treatment of the Arabs. Butler in the North American Department sympathized 
with all the concerns from the Eastern Department, suggesting rejecting the report and ways 
to limit the damage it could have on Anglo-American relations, which Beeley endorsed. 
Inverchapel also provides support against the Anglo-American initiative, as he warned of the 
unlikelihood of Truman hearing British concerns. A matter on which even Sargent agreed. 
Even more concerns from the Eastern Department came from Shone and Clayton who 
warned that accommodating the United States was damaging Britain’s reputation among the 
Arabs and that it would not serve to keep Britain secure in the Middle East. This shows that 
as the Anglo-American initiative developed the FO was becoming more vocal and unified 
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against a solution with the United States. Howe searched for alternatives with the Colonial 
Office, and Sargent who was mostly absent from his department concerns started to 
acknowledge the difficulties of the Anglo-American initiative. 
FO opposition to alienating the Arabs to gain an accommodation with the US is 
shown further when the FO partook in Colonial Office and the Cabinet discussions on an 
alternative to an Anglo-American solution, to which the Clayton and Beeley offered some 
support for provincial autonomy as a potential alternative to the Anglo-American initiative. 
During this time the Eastern Department remained consistent in its warnings against 
accommodating the United States over the Arabs, with Stonehewer-Bird warning that large 
scale Jewish immigration would ruin Britain’s relationship with the Arabs, which was again 
endorsed by Baxter.  
The FO was for the most part unified and consistent in warning against the dangers of 
allowing 100,000 Jewish immigrants entry into Palestine, and of the Anglo-American 
Committee’s report. The only exceptions came from Howe and Sargent, who both offered 
some support to Bevin’s Anglo-American solution. With the former sharing his colleague’s 
concerns, and partaking in discussions for an alternative, and the latter still acknowledging 
some of the difficulties of an Anglo-American solution. The consistent and unified concerns 
within the Eastern Department from; Wikeley, Smith, Kinahan, Beeley, Smart, Stonehewer-
Bird and Shone were frequently endorsed by Baxter, and were also heard the in the North 
American Department by Butler and Inverchapel. The FO believed that the Anglo-American 
initiative was damaging to Britain’s position in the Middle East and was dismayed at times 
by Truman’s consistent and public calls for allowing 100,000 Jewish people entry into 
Palestine. Truman pushed for this without any agreement being in place to which to consult 
the Arabs, alienating them, and resulting in Arab hostility to an Anglo-American solution. 
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Concerned over the effect this could have on Arab goodwill, the FO mostly likely met the 





















The End of the Anglo-American Initiative and the London Conference 
The collapse of the Anglo-American initiative dramatically reduced American influence upon 
the British government’s Palestine policy. Truman had lost credibility with the British by 
rejecting the agreement between the Anglo-American expert’s team, which for three months 
negotiated a practical application to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 
recommendations. The end of the joint initiative and the reduction of future American 
influence is initially demonstrated by Attlee’s rejection of Truman’s offer to help fund a 
solution, when he declared any solution “must, as matter stand, be one which we can put into 
effect with our resources alone.”103 Such a position was welcomed in the FO’s Eastern 
Department, with a general belief that Britain was now free to find its own solution with the 
Arabs. However, the failure of the Anglo-American initiative did not mute Truman over 
Palestine, and he still sought to encourage a solution desirable to the Americans. A month 
after the collapse of the initiative Truman reported to the US press that the Morrison-Grady 
plan, and a loan of $300 million to assist in delivering a solution was “still under 
consideration.”104 This raised an immediate reaction within the FO, Beeley arguing that “No 
doubt (Truman) hopes that this half promise will enable him still to exercise indirectly some 
of the influence which he is no longer brining to bear directly.”105 Beeley was clearly hostile 
to Truman’s attempts to try and interfere, after his rejection of the Morrison-Grady Plan. 
Beeley went on to telegram Sargent that; 
“This promise is so vague, depending as it does upon the mood of Congress and on 
the almost incalculable reaction of the American public opinion, to whatever we 
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decide, that it would probably be unwise to take seriously into account the prospect of 
financial help from the United States in the framing of our Palestine policy.”106 
This was a continuation of the Eastern Department’s consensus against American 
involvement in finding a solution. Further American interference after the fall of the Anglo-
American initiative seems to strike increasing frustration and resentment in the FO.  This is 
demonstrated by the Eastern Department’s opposition to Truman’s demands insofar, and 
Beeley’s tone, and is supported by Jones who argued that the FO’s “disdain felt towards a US 
role is evident”, and that there was a “complete absence from the Foreign Office files of 
anything approaching self-criticism or an expression of regret at the demise of the Anglo-
American initiative.”107 The FO documents show that Wikeley, Smith, Kinahan, Beeley, 
Smart, Stonehewer-Bird, Shone, and Baxter all warned against Truman’s desires for the 
admission of a 100,000 Jews into Palestine, and against alienating the Arabs in favour of the 
Americans. Naturally, there would be little regret in the FO at the collapse of the joint 
initiative, which would have been welcomed. Beeley’s comments regarding Truman press 
statements demonstrate a continuation in the FO against cooperation with the United States at 
the expense of pursing a solution with the Arabs, which was about to commence at the 
London Conference.  
The unity in the Eastern Department, and the FO’s resistance to American demands 
were clear before the start of the London Conference. There was an exception to this, which 
went against the overall position of the FO. This was from Inverchapel and most notable 
before the start of the London Conference. Prior to the fall of the Anglo-American initiative 
Inverchapel had reported Truman’s inflexibility and a widening gulf between the two 
governments, however he did not display an opposing attitude to Butler in the North 
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American Department or against the concerns of the Eastern Department previously 
mentioned. However, with the fall of the Anglo-American initiative, and a reduction in direct 
American influence on the negotiations, Inverchapel started to take a more active role in 
engaging with American policy ideas, which were contrary to the will of the Eastern 
Department and went beyond government policy. Just before the London Conference started, 
Nanhum Goldmann (Jewish Agency US Branch) was lobbying the US government to support 
his plan for a solution on Palestine, which was based on partition favourable to the Jews. 
Goldmann pressed for this to be accepted sooner rather than later, on the rational that the 
Jewish Agency would become more militant if an acceptable solution was not found.108 This 
gained traction in the American administration and Acheson wrote to William Averell 
Harriman, the US Ambassador to the UK, arguing that “In our view this recent development 
offers hope that (the) Jewish Agency will realistically join in (the) search for (a) practical 
solution…” and that the “British Government might let it be known that coming consultations 
will not be rigidly bound to (the) consideration (of) one plan”109 a reference to the British 
intention of using provincial autonomy as the initial basis for discussions. Goldmann’s 
partition suggestion was then referenced by Truman to Attlee in a telegram after the 
breakdown of the Anglo-American initiative, writing that “I believe the search for a solution 
to this difficult problem should continue. I have therefore instructed our Embassy in London 
to discuss with you… certain suggestions that have been made to us.”110 This further 
demonstrates how the US continued to participate in discussions with the Jewish Agency and 
lobby the British government over these discussions. It is in these discussions that 
Inverchapel took an unsynchronized position to his colleagues in the FO. On 9 August 1946, 
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Inverchapel met Goldmann and reported his partition plan back to the FO, where he stated 
Acheson “did not deny” the support Goldmann’s plan had gained in the American 
administration.111 Goldmann claimed Inverchapel was receptive to his plan and that he said 
“this is first sign of light I have seen. Take it up with Bevin in Paris.”112 Rather extraordinary, 
considering it went against the British government’s official position of using provincial 
autonomy as the basis for the London Conference, and by the fact partition was not supported 
in the FO by anyone so far. At this stage Inverchapel’s receptiveness to Goldmann’s plan and 
American support was somewhat premature, and it was not until Truman made his infamous 
Yom Kippur statement that Inverchapel’s differences from his colleagues in the FO can be 
substantiated.   
The FO perspective on the London Conference will be explored more in the next 
chapter, due to the focus of the conference being on discussions with the Arab states. During 
the conference, the US had no direct involvement in the negotiations, but continued to 
indirectly push two matters. The first matter was Truman’s request that provincial autonomy 
not be the only solution discussed. This was to give Goldmann’s plan consideration. This was 
not a significant matter, as the British position was that provincial autonomy would be the 
initial basis for discussions, and this did not change that. Also, partition was not supported in 
the FO or by the Arab states. Therefore, the only attendees had no interests in partition, and it 
was unlikely to become problem. The second issue was Truman continued calls for the 
immediate allocation of 100,000 immigration certificates to be issued. By 14 August 1946, 
Inverchapel warned that Truman was likely to make more public calls for the 100,000 and for 
Goldmann’s partition plan to be discussed.113 This was met with little response by the FO. It 
was for the most part, a repetitive reminder of the American position, while the FO sought to 
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find a solution with the Arabs at the London Conference, as Jones surmised “While the hour 
of the Foreign Office was at hand and while the conference was underway, the US 
government had shrunk from all involvement.”114 The diminished American role, and the 
lack of credibility after Truman rejected the Morrison-Grady Plan resulted in little attention 
being paid by the FO to American considerations, the focus was on the Arab states, and 
finding a solution. When the conference adjourned 2 October 1946, this changed 
dramatically. The following day Truman telegraphed Attlee that he hoped for the admission 
of 100,000 Jews entry into Palestine be permitted “in the interim” and that the American 
public had grave concern over the displaced persons in Europe, and as a response “I find it 
necessary to make a further statement at once.”115 A draft of Truman’s intended statement 
was given to Inverchapel and Attlee, he called for the admission of 100,000 Jews entry into 
Palestine to be allowed immediately, and for a viable Jewish state to be created in Palestine. 
Attlee immediately replied that “I earnestly request you to postpone making your 
statement.”116 This would allow Attlee to consult with Bevin in Paris, and Bevin suggested to 
Byrnes that the British and Americans take a reasonable amount of the 100,000 as an 
immediate gesture, with a slight increase of immigration into Palestine. This flurry of activity 
triggered by Truman’s wish to make a statement on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, 
immediately brought the Americans back into British consideration. The fact Bevin offered 
Byrne’s an Anglo-American immigration deal, with a slight increase in Palestine’s intake, 
shows just how concerned the British were with Truman becoming so publicly involved, and 
advocating Jewish Agency demands. The climax to Truman’s Yom Kippur statement came 
with Attlee’s furious reply; 
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“I have received with great regret your letter refusing even a few hours grace to the 
Prime Minister of the country which has the actual responsibility of the government 
Palestine in order that he might acquaint you with the actual situation and the 
probable results of your actions.  These may well include the frustration of the patient 
efforts to achieve a settlement and the loss of still more lives in Palestine. 
I am astonished that you did not wait to acquaint yourself with the reasons for the 
suspension of the conference with the Arabs. You do not seem to have been informed 
that so far from negotiations having been broken off, conversations with leading 
Zionists with a view of entering the conference were proceeding with good prospects 
of success. I shall await with interest to learn what were the imperative reasons which 
compelled this precipitancy.”117  
Attlee’s telegram was likely well support by the entire Eastern Department, as well as by 
Butler in the North American Department. Both had continuously warned against Truman’s 
desire to allow 100,000 Jews entry to Palestine, and his more recent calls for partition. 
Inverchapel, however, continued in his initial receptiveness to Goldman and Acheson 
mentioned previously, and even sympathized with Truman Yom Kippur speech, writing to 
Sargent that Truman was “threatened by immediate dangers” a reference to congressional 
elections in November.118 Acheson wrote of Inverchapels reaction to Truman’s speech, 
stating that he believed “while the statement would probably make London very angry, he 
believed that in the long run it might be beneficial to the solution of the whole question”, and 
that Inverchapel went on to request “If I could give him any information which he might use 
to ameliorate the feelings of London by indicating the difficulties of the President.”119 
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Inverchapel’s sympathetic ear to American considerations is further argued by Hugh Dalton, 
the British Chancellor of Exchequer, who stated that Inverchapel  “thinks that Palestine is 
being badly handled by H.M.G. We must, he thinks, chose between friendship of (the) world 
and all Arab States. He is quite clear that we should prefer the former.”120 These statements 
demonstrate that the ambassador to the United States did not seem to share the hostility of the 
Eastern Department towards Truman’s calls, and Inverchapel went against Butler who had 
suggested effectively ignoring Truman previously so as not to alienate the Arabs. Attlee and 
Bevin were clear on the potential damage of Truman’s speech, yet Inverchapel seemed to 
against the views of his government and his office. This division from a mostly united FO 
was highlighted and criticized by Beeley, who wrote that “I think the time has come to ask 
the Embassy to justify their general policy on appeasing the Zionists. Its results are not up to 
now encouraging.”121 This demonstrates that Acheson’s, Goldmann’s and Dalton’s accounts 
of Inverchapels sympathetic views were probably reliable, and that they were resented in the 
Eastern Department.  
Another demonstration of Inverchapel going against the FO position - is when he was 
instructed to find out the US position on partition, a matter Bevin, the Cabinet, and the FO 
did not support at this time. On 22 November 1946, he met Acheson to discuss the matter, 
saying that “Mr. Bevin is moving rapidly towards acceptance of partition as the solution” but 
could not proceed “unless he knows with definiteness the attitude of the United States.”122 
Inverchapel went well beyond his instructions, which Bevin stated were to “find out from the 
State Department, as ambassador and not committing me, what their attitude really was 
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(regarding partition)”.123 This is another example of Inverchapel’s clear sympathies to the 
Zionist cause, and is another demonstration of going against the concerns of the Eastern 
Department, and the overall FO view which did not back partition. A view still shared by 
Bevin and Sargent, who sought to proceed with the London Conference and provincial 
autonomy as the basis for a solution. The fact Inverchapel committed Bevin as “rapidly 
moving towards partition”124 and that it was dependent on US support is astonishing. During 
November 1946, Bevin was still trying to obtain Jewish Agency attendance at the London 
Conference, he had met Silver and ruled out discussing partition at these meetings, and 
thereafter refused to accept Goldmann’s plan as a condition for Jewish attendance, writing to 
Attlee “H.M.G’s Government having called a conference of two parties cannot allow the 
agenda… to be dictated by one of them.”125 Inverchapel was therefore going beyond his 
instructions in being very sympathetic to the domestic pressures Truman faced, as well as to 
the partition proposals made by Goldmann. Inverchapel was therefore committing the British 
to new positions. This was against the majority view in the FO and created concern in the 
Eastern Department. This demonstration of division between Inverchapel and his FO 
colleagues should not be exaggerated though. Inverchapel influence on FO thought and 
action was limited, and his views did not gain traction elsewhere in the FO.  
In response to British discussions of partition Beeley in collaboration with Brook, 
headed an Eastern Department effort to write off partition. During December, Brook, Beeley 
and the Eastern Department sent Bevin papers warning against partition. An Eastern 
Department paper ‘A Note on Partition’ argued that partition would be nearly impossible to 
proceed with, due to the inability to create two viable states in Palestine, and the opposition 
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of the Jewish Agency to a minor state, as well as Arab opposition to partition in general. The 
paper argued that the matter would need United Nations approval something which the COS, 
Bevin and the FO sought to avoid. The paper concluded that this would result in “a decline of 
British influence, and an increase of Russian influence” in the Middle East.126 The Eastern 
Department wrote a second paper on how to proceed, which discussed the potential to revise 
the Arab plan at the London Conference. Here the Eastern Department argued that the Arab 
proposals “cannot be accepted as the stand” and that proposals should be brought forward to 
allow at least half of the 100,00 to be accepted initially, followed by a lower monthly amount. 
The Eastern Department felt that if the Arab proposals were used as a “basis for 
negotiation… there is no reason to suppose that in those circumstances the Arab delegates 
could not be induced to make substantial concessions”.127 The Eastern Department argued 
that the future choices were: to refer Palestine to the United Nations and withdraw, to 
partition Palestine and anger the Arabs, or, to proceed with British adaptations to the Arab 
proposals, which was support by the Eastern Department. These efforts from Beeley and the 
Eastern Department were a clear push against early mentions of partition in the British 
government which had been encouraged by a sympathetic Inverchapel.  
This effort against partition demonstrates that the FO was consistently concerned with 
maintaining Arab goodwill. This was not to say that Beeley or the Eastern Department 
completely discarded the United States during the London Conference. They discussed the 
prospect of allowing 50,000 Jews initial entry into Palestine, and this demonstrates that 
American requests were being considered. The Eastern Department papers did consider a 
backlash from Truman and the United States administration if the 100,000 was not met, and 
if Goldmann’s partition plan was not given consideration. However, Eastern Department 
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concern was to a limited extent, and the December papers argued that United States anger 
was “doubtful to be either widespread or lasting”128 if Britain failed to meet their desires. The 
papers also argued that any solution which did not appease the Jewish Agency fully would 
meet resentment in the United States. Meeting American demands was a consideration to the 
Eastern Department, but it was not vital, and focus was firmly on provincial autonomy, and 
working with the Arabs to find a common position instead. This was not to say that efforts 
towards inclusion of the Jewish Agency were not being made, their participation was being 
pushed, but would not be accepted under a precondition of their plan being the basis of the 
conference. Overall, it was clear by the adjournment of the London Conference that the 
Eastern Department had not changed its position. That maintaining a dialogue with the Arabs 
was vital, and that meeting American and Jewish Agency demands at a significant expense of 
Arab goodwill was not an option. The only noticeable division at the time was from 
Inverchapel, who was sympathetic to Truman’s domestic pressures, and receptive to 
Goldmann’s partition plan, however this was an isolated view in the FO.  The Eastern 
Department was leading FO policy and pressing Bevin to hear their untied concerns. Beeley 
and Brook’s collaboration was a significant effort to prevent American requests being 
accepted by the British government. Believing that accommodating the Americans would 
sacrifice Arab goodwill and harm Britain’s increasingly precarious position in the Middle 
East.  
The FO was consistently opposed to cooperation with the United States and Bevin’s 
attempts to find a solution with Truman. The Harrison Report’s recommendation for 
immediately permitting 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine was unanimously opposed 
in the FO.  Baxter warned that following US policy on Palestine would have a “deplorable 
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effect on Anglo-Arab relations”129  and Beeley reinforced this stating that 100,000 “would 
not be believed.”130  The Anglo-American initiative was met with skepticism and even 
rejection by the Eastern Department, with Smith stating “they will start a fire here which we 
shall have to put out at considerable sacrifice to ourselves.”131  Limited deviation from the 
general FO line of caution and skepticism was shown when Howe and Sargent supported 
Bevin in his attempt to purse an Anglo-American solution. This “fresh approach” was 
supported by Howe and Sargent to remove the US as an irresponsible critic, and make her 
“assume a share of the responsibility for the settlement.”132  Despite this deviation, Howe’s 
placed little faith in an Anglo-American solution and was involved in discussions for a 
British solution which was being orchestrated in the Colonial Office. Sargent did not oppose 
Bevin’s Anglo-American solution, however, he did share the key concerns of his colleagues, 
who consistently argued that scrapping the White Paper and allowing the entry of 100,000 
Jews into Palestine would go against British interests. The FO actively sought alternatives to 
Bevin’s Anglo-American initiative. During the formation of the Anglo-American Committee, 
Baxter, Beeley and Kinahan with some involvement from Howe, discussed with Martin and 
Harris a FO-Colonial Office solution. Hostility against the Anglo-American Committee 
recommendations was further encouraged by Brook who informed Cabinet that it would have 
a “disastrous effect on our position in the Middle East.”133 Encouraged, Wikeley joined 
Baxter, Beeley, Smith and Kinahan in pressing Bevin to reject the Anglo-American initiative. 
In the Northern American Department, Butler went so far to suggest rejecting Truman’s 
desires outright and Inverchapel warned that Truman position was unlikely to change, 
demonstrating unity between the two departments.  
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During the Morrison-Grady discussions, little changed, Inverchapel and Sargent 
warned that Truman was unlikely to be flexible on his calls for 100,000 Jews being permitted 
entry into Palestine, or for a national home for them. The repetitive warning in the Eastern 
Department by Beeley and Baxter were being support by Shone, Wikeley, Clayton and 
Stonehewer-Bird. American support for Zionism was viewed as “poising Arab thought” 
against Britain, who was increasingly being viewed as “the villain in the background”.134 
Events in Palestine became more violent during the summer of 1946, and this helped Bevin 
accept the Colonial Office’s provincial autonomy scheme as a basis for Morrison to use in 
negotiations with Grady. The FO did not enthusiastically support provincial autonomy, but 
without a scheme of its own it was viewed by Baxter and Beeley as a way to maintain the 
White Paper. This demonstrates the lengths at which the FO sought to avoid the Anglo-
American initiative. The British negotiation during the Morrison-Grady discussions led to 
provincial autonomy being accepted jointly. Truman’s eventual rejection of the plan would 
have been met with relief by most in the FO. As it saw the United States removed from the 
formal negotiations for Palestine’s future, and limited the motivation to engage with 
American demands at the expense of Arab goodwill.  
The rejection of the Morrison-Grady Plan did little to mute Truman’s repetitive calls 
for allowing 100,000 Jews entry in Palestine, and his demands to scrap the white paper and 
provide a Jewish national home in Palestine. Truman’s rejection removed the United States 
from the negotiating process, but this did not stop US attempts to influence the British 
position.  The “half promise”135 of $300 million towards implementing a solution was 
resented by Beeley and failed to motivate Sargent to a new defence of an Anglo-American 
initiative. Attlee also made the British position clear by arguing that Britain could not 
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depended on American financial assistance in delivering a solution, and this was met with 
concurrence by Clayton who warned of Arab hostility to the idea. FO unity against Truman’s 
calls for allowing 100,000 Jews entry into Palestine remained consistent during this period, 
and the concerns previously raised by Wikeley, Smith, Kinahan, Beeley, Smart, Stonehewer-
Bird, Shone, and Baxter continued. All this demonstrates that the concerns the FO held 
during the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, and during the Morrison-Grady 
proposals, remained consistently against appeasing Truman’s plans. When official 
negotiations broke off due to Truman’s rejection of the Morrison-Grady Plan, there was little 
incentive to hear American desires, and during the London Conference the United States was, 
for the most part, absent from British thought. It was difficult for Bevin to push for Anglo-
American cooperation, when Truman had rejected the joint conclusions which resulted from 
the Anglo-American expert discussions. Truman had reduced credibility, and formal 
negotiations with the United States ceased, which left the FO free to find their own solution 
via the London Conference, a outcome which the FO universally saw as the best way to 
secure Britain’s position in the Middle East.  
During the London Conference, American influence was mostly removed, however 
Inverchapel started to become a more sympathetic ear. He was receptive to Goldmann’s 
partition plan, despite the fact provincial autonomy was the British position for the basis of 
discussions with the Arabs. He also was similarly understanding of Truman’s repetitive calls 
allowing 100,000 Jews entry into Palestine. The most notable deviation from the FO line was 
Inverchapel, and this was to be demonstrated further by his lack of hostility to the Yom 
Kippur statement. This statement which the British government attempted to delay, went 
against the British position at the London Conference, and was clearly going to incite Arab 
hostility to the negotiations and widen the gulf between the Jews and Arabs. Truman’s 
statement was met with hostility in the Eastern Department and wider FO. They believed it 
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would alienate the Arabs, strengthen Jewish demands, and that it could ruin the prospect of 
the London Conference finding a solution. This view was shared by Attlee, who showed clear 
opposition to Truman’s actions and statement in his remarkable telegram were he effectively 
lectures the President of the United States. These facts help demonstrate just how out of touch 
Inverchapel was with his own office and government. Criticism from within the FO against 
Inverchapel, headed by Beeley in the Eastern Department, demonstrates how Inverchapel was 
isolated in his sympathetic approach to Zionism and American concerns. Finally, Inverchapel 
views can be seen as irrefutably against the FO position, and that of his own Government’s, 
when he was tasked to find out what the Americans thought of partition. Inverchapel went 
against Bevin’s instructions, and went as far to say he was moving “rapidly moving towards 
partition”136 and that Bevin needed American support before he could embark on this. This is 
another clear demonstration that Inverchapel was an isolated example against the general FO 
position of keeping the Arabs on side and not accommodating Truman’s desires at the 
expense of Anglo-Arab relations. Aside from the sympathetic ear of Inverchapel, who may 
have encouraged American persistence, the United States only became a consideration during 
the London Conference because of Truman’s Yom Kippur statement. The days between 
warning Attlee and releasing the statement showed a brief flurry of diplomacy and some 
consideration to addressing part of the 100,000. However, this all evaporated when Truman 
made his Yom Kippur statement, which was met with British hostility and diminished the 
influence of Truman desires on Britain’s Palestine policy. This was met with silent relief in 
the Eastern Department as it allowed more freedom in negotiations with the Arabs. Truman 
removed the United States from formal negotiations when he rejected the Morrison-Grady 
Plan, he then removed consideration to the American position with his Yom Kippur 
 




statement. The overall result of Anglo-American interactions after the fall of the Anglo-
American initiative, and during the London Conference, was a fortification in the Eastern 
Departments perspective on the matter. This was being supported by Brook and as a result 
helped fuel the Cabinet, and eventually Bevin, to move away from focusing on Anglo-
American cooperation over Palestine in order to find a solution.    
The FO started this period opposed to cooperating with the United States on Truman’s 
desire to scrap the restrictions of the White Paper and allow 100,000 Jews into Palestine. 
These calls were met with overwhelming opposition in the FO. Initially from the Eastern 
Department leading voices; Beeley, and Baxter, which were soon endorsed by Kinahan, 
Smart, Smith, Shone, Stonehewer Bird and Wikeley. During the Anglo-American Committee 
of Inquiry these individuals continued to raise concerns against alienating the Arab and the 
dangers of scraping the White Paper and the infeasibility of allowing 100,000 Jews into 
Palestine. When the Anglo-American Committee made its report, Butler suggested the 
possibility of ignoring Truman’s desires, in a show of unity with Eastern Department 
concerns, and at this was not opposed by Inverchapel who reported similarly as Butler that 
Truman was unlikely to become flexible. Truman’s rejection of the Morrison Grady Plan, and 
his Yom Kippur Statement caused Howe and even Sargent initial support for Bevin’s Anglo-
American initiative to pass, and the Colonial Office-FO provincial autonomy discussions 
encouraged by the Cabinet were eventually accepted by Bevin. Thereafter the only deviation 
in FO thought was from Inverchapels sympathetic discussions with Goldmann and Acheson, 
which were clearly isolated and not appreciated among his colleagues. Overall, the FO 
developed an increasingly unaccommodating approach towards American pressures, fueled in 
part, by actions Truman took which undermined British efforts.  The FO was unwilling to 
recommend actions which would alienate Britain from her Arab allies, in order to 
accommodate Truman, and deviation from this general FO perspective was limited to the 
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fleeting efforts of Howe and Sargent to support Bevin, and the isolated Zionist sympathies of 
Inverchapel. Anglo-American cooperation was at times important, but not pivotal in 




















The Foreign Office Perspective on Withdrawal and the Arab States 
The end of the Second World War resulted in a partition of Europe, with the Soviet Union 
moving from ally to adversary. Aside from limiting further expansion of Soviet influence in 
Europe, Britain sought to maintain its position in the Middle East, to prevent Soviet 
penetration and to maintain offensive abilities from the Middle East. The value of oil, the 
Suze canal, the importance of communications lines between West and East, placed the 
Middle East central in British strategic considerations. As a result of this, the FO’s main 
preoccupation resulting from the Palestine crises, was trying to maintain Arab goodwill. This 
was vital to maintaining a paramount position in the Middle East, outlined as key to British 
security in the ‘three pillar strategy’, formed in the post-World War Two defence review. 
Without Arab goodwill and future Arab cooperation, Britain could lose her military rights to 
station forces in the Middle East, which could allow the Soviet Union to expand her influence 
in the Middle East substantially. The COS the Ministry of Defence (MOD) presented 
consistent and unyielding arguments of the strategic implications of the British withdrawal 
from Palestine. The FO sought greater influence on the COS, feeling FO matters were not 
being considered. As a result, to increase cohesion between these two departments the 
Services Liaison Department (SLD) was created, as an intermediary between the FO and 
SLD. The COS argued that “The preservation of our strategic position in the Middle East as a 
whole would be gravely prejudiced if our right to station British forces in Palestine were not 
retained.”137 The FO heard these concerns, but attempting to maintain strategic rights in 
Palestine proved increasingly difficult.  To mitigate the impending strategic losses resulting 
from the withdrawal, which would be the probable loss of military rights in Palestine, the FO 
focused its energies on trying to maintain Arab goodwill. The FO believed this was 
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imperative to extend and gain military rights elsewhere in the region, seen as vital to retaining 
a paramount position in the Middle East. There was no coherent government view over 
Palestine. The COS prioritized maintaining military rights in Palestine, while the FO looked 
to Iraq, Transjordan, and Egypt to address the security dilemmas withdrawing from Palestine 
was going to create.  
This chapter will focus on the FO’s largest concern, the need to maintain Arab 
goodwill, and look at this from the perspective of the most relevant parts of the FO, being the 
Eastern Department and members of the British Diplomatic Service in the key embassies, 
which were in Transjordan, Egypt and Iraq. These Arab nations are most significant as they 
housed the largest British military garrisons in the Middle East, and the FO was actively 
trying to renew military rights with these states. Additionally, Iraq and Egypt were greater 
powers then their Arab neighbours and held most influence in the Arab League. Transjordan 
while smaller, neighbored Palestine and held a particularly special relationship with the 
British, as well hosting the Arab legion which the British had large influence on. The FO’s 
concerns on the effect of withdrawal on relations with these states is of vital importance, and 
their recommendations on future actions will be presented. The extent of support offered 
from Sargent, will be included to highlight where there was consensus and division in these 
most relevant parts of the FO, and how this corresponded with government policy and taken 
actions.  The resulting FO approach to the Arab states will analyzed, if they focused on 
furthering British objectives with Arab states individually, or if they preferred to address 
collectively the concerns of the Arabs through the Arab League or the London Conference 
(September 1946 and February 1947). This line of inquiry provides the most relevant FO 
perspectives, resulting from the withdrawal and partition of Palestine, and shows how the FO 
tried to reduce the damage the crisis in Palestine was causing to Britain’s position in the 
Middle East. This chapter will look at how Palestine affected British relations with the three 
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key Arab States, Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan. It will be argued that the FO undertook large 
efforts to maintain British military rights in these nations central to their Middle Eastern 
policy, to mitigate the challenges Palestine was beginning to create to British dominance in 
the region. The pressures of Palestine and of growing Arab nationalism will be considered, 
and how they affected FO policy. 
There is historical consensus on the desire to maintain Arab goodwill amongst the British 
government, the COS, and the MOD, but a focus of how Palestine influenced the FO, and its 
subsequent reactions are limited. Earlier studies from Fitzsimons138 and Monroe139 consider 
the British desire to maintain relations with Arab States but do so with an emphasis on rising 
Arab nationalism in the Middle East, and a rejection of western imperialism. These studies do 
not consider FO awareness of Arab nationalism, and do not contribute to understanding the 
FO perspective. Another early study by Bullard140 similarly considers Britain’s position in the 
Middle East during the Palestine crisis, with focus on Anglo-Egyptian relations. However, 
this study also neglects how Palestine and Arab nationalism effected FO views, and what 
advice they provided when Britain attempted treaty renegotiation with the Arab states.  
More substantial contributions to understanding the British perspectives on the 
withdrawal from Palestine where published during the 1980’s, coming from Ovendale141 and 
Louis.142  They provide comprehensive narratives of British negotiations and policy changes 
between the Morrison-Grady Plan and the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, 
announced on 29 November 1947. The former was discussed in the last chapter, and the latter 
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was the United Nations’ majority plan, which recommended partition. Ovendale and Louis 
frequently recognised the desire of the British to maintain Arab goodwill. They both include 
some FO insight into the subject, but frame their narratives around the Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin, the Cabinet and the COS. Louis does provide deeper insight into FO thought on 
Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan. However, he does not frame these round events in Palestine 
specifically, preferring to look at the wider British strategic position in the Middle East.  A 
more relevant contribution in the 1980’s came from Jones.143 He provides a critical account 
of FO policy and diplomacy surrounding withdrawal. Arguing that there was a “positive 
aversion in the FO towards anything which might fragment a unified Arab position…”144  His 
main premise is that the FO was obsessed with maintaining Arab unity, to such an extent that 
it deliberately and repeatedly thwarted other attempts to find a solution to the deadlock. In 
order to force a solution via the FO orchestrated London Conference, where the Arabs had a 
unified position. This view fails consider successfully the domestic and political pressures the 
Arab states were under, which was to do right by their fellow Arabs. Consequently, Jones 
fails to appreciate the FO awareness of this problem and the effect it could have on Britain 
entire position in the Middle East.  
More recent studies by Pappe,145 Fieldhouse,146 and Smith147 fail to provide greater 
coverage of an FO perspective compared to their predecessors. Pappe is more relevant as his 
study focuses on the relationship between Kirkbride and Abdullah, exploring the relationship 
of Britain’s closest Arab ally, one of the three Arab states this chapter focuses on. However, 
the author does not specifically frame his discussion around Palestine, and Kirkbride is but 
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one of many different relevant figures working for and under the FO. Therefore, an overall 
FO perspective on the British withdrawal from Palestine is not gained. Smith focuses his 
work on the organisation and struggle between the Palestinian Arab and Jews, but his 
inclusion of a British perspective is based almost entirely on Bevin and Attlee, lacking any 
consideration of the FO. Fieldhouse provides the historical context to Britain’s weakening 
position in the Middle, looking at increasing Arab rejection of western imperialism, and how 
this limited Britain’s ability to maintain bases, and meet the requirements of the COS. 
However, his study does not look at the FO perspective of these events and fails to include 
FO sources. Overall, these studies provide historical coverage to the events surrounding the 
crises in Palestine, and how it affected Anglo-Arab relations and treaty renegotiation. These 
historians often choose to focus on, Bevin, Attlee, the COS, and the Colonial Office in 
demonstrating a British perspective. Louis and Ovendale include some FO thought, although 
to a limited extent, and Jones fails to provide balance to the FO sources he employs. This 
leaves room for greater use of FO sources in understanding the extent that the FO wished to 
maintain Arab goodwill and the motives behind this.  
By 1947, the British position in the Middle East was becoming precarious, and the 
withdrawal from Palestine was going to significantly reduce Britain’s military presence. 
Consequently, securing alliances became a priority for the FO. Palestine housed 100,000 
British troops,148 had naval facilities and British oil refineries in Haifa, and was connected to 
a major oil pipeline from Kirkuk in Iraq.149 Trying to maintain these privileges in Palestine 
was of highest priority to the COS, and this was recognized by the FO and their attempts to 
form renewed alliances were to meet the general security concerns of the COS and British 
Army.150 As Monroe notes, “Between March 1946 and January 1948, the British Government 
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attempted treaty re-negotiation everywhere.”151 The future governance of Palestine was 
uncertain, and maintaining any military rights there was increasingly unlikely to the FO. It 
was imperative that existing privileges in neighboring Arab states were kept where possible 
such as in Egypt and Iraq, and extended where they could be, such as in Transjordan.  
From a militarily standpoint Egypt strategically was the most significant Arab state to 
consider. The importance of the Suez Canal to connect British possessions in Asia, Africa 
and Europe is well known, and Egypt was the lynchpin of British security plans in the Middle 
East. It was accepted that Iraq would be used for strategic bombing, but was undefendable, 
and that Palestine and to an extent Transjordan would be the screen to help protect Egypt.152 
Before 1947 Egypt had housed up to 200,000 personnel “the largest reservoir of military 
strength outside India”153 Maintaining the British position in Egypt was all the more vital 
with the potential loss of Palestine. It was during this time however that Egyptian demands 
for British evacuation began to reach a climax. The FO entered negotiations with Egypt on 
the prospect of revising the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which allowed the British 
significant military rights to protect the Suez Canal.  The Ambassador to Egypt, Sir Ronald 
Campbell, summarized that 1947 started with “unpromising negotiations dragging on 
between the British and Egyptian Governments for a revised treaty.”154 Despite Egypt having 
some interest in Palestine, Campbell argued they were focused on gaining autonomy over 
Sudan, “The Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the two uncompromising and so far inseparable 
Egyptian demands for the evacuation of British troops from Egypt and for undisputed 
sovereign rights in Sudan, took pride of place in the field of foreign relations during the 
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greater part of the period under review.”155 Before the pressures of Palestine, Anglo-Egyptian 
relations had already deteriorated significantly and Britain had accepted the reality of moving 
out of Egypt. Despite this, maintaining positive relations was still important. Egypt was 
strategically the most significant Arab state for Britain and limiting further damage to 
relations was a FO priority.  
 Palestine may have not been the Egyptian priority at the beginning of 1947, however 
Campbell went on to report that “At the end of the year Egyptian attention became more 
focused than previously on Palestine.”156 Campbell argued that Anglo-Egyptian relations 
were being adversely affected by events in Palestine, which caused a “profound shock to the 
Egyptian political opinion.”157 Campbell surmised Britain took “a share of the blame for 
being the villain in the background who was initially responsible for the creation of this 
problem.”158 The FO was unable to pacify the Egyptian Prime Minster, Nokrashy Pasha, or 
King Farouk. In the backdrop of disagreements on treaty revision, Sudan, and Palestine, 
Egypt went to the United Nations Security Council were they “alleged that the British troops 
were stationed on Egyptian territory against the unanimous will of the people.”  Growing 
anti-British sentiment in Egypt was clear, which resorted in pro-British organizations being 
attacked. The, Anglo Egyptian Union, Cairo University Graduates’ Club and the Brotherhood 
of Freedom being targeted by protesters, which resulted in damages and the loss of a few 
British lives.”159 Further political embarrassment was reported by the FO when King Farouk 
hoisted the Egyptian flag over the Kasr-el-Nil barracks in Cairo. Mitigating the loss of 
Palestinian military rights, with renewed Egyptian ones seemed unlikely and Campbell 
 







ultimately concluded such efforts were “doomed”.160 It was hereafter the FO accepted that 
British forces would have to leave Egypt and based future contingencies upon leaving Egypt 
by 1956.  
The potential loss of Palestine and Egyptian demand for British evacuation was to 
complicate relations with other Arab Nations too. Campbell reported, 
“Egyptian influence continued throughout the year to predominate in the Arab 
League. At the league’s meetings the Arab States, some a little reluctantly expressed 
their support for the Egyptian claims against Britain and, later in the year, their 
unanimous decision to work for a united Arab Palestine.”   
Campbell argued that Egypt was the leading power in the Arab League, and that 
confrontation over Palestine could engulf relations with the other Arab League powers. The 
Arab position was publicly unified in its demands at the London Conferences. An end to 
Jewish immigration, independence for Palestine ruled by the Arab majority at the end of the 
mandate, and a return to the White Paper which stated 50,000-75,000 Jewish immigrants 
were to be given entrance to Palestine for five years, thereafter any future Jewish immigration 
would be determined by the Arab majority in Palestine.  Rising nationalism in Arab countries 
fueled by events in Palestine as well a growing rejection of British and French imperialism 
created a difficult environment for the FO to maintain Arab goodwill and gain base rights 
elsewhere. Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine was pending and any future rights there were 
unlikely. In Egypt, the British presence was being rejected and demands for withdrawal were 
clear and uncompromising.  This was shown the growing anti-British sentiment in Egypt, 
demands from the government, which included the threat to involve the United Nations in 





military rights in Iraq and Transjordan were ever more important. It was in this context, that 
the FO tried to maintain Arab goodwill, in hope that future relationships with Iraq and 
Transjordan would not be prejudiced by the British withdrawal from Palestine.  
As previously mentioned Britain’s military footprint in Egypt was large, and these 
troops and military assets needed to be rehoused locally in the Middle East to ensure Britain’s 
military position was not diminished, which the British believed would have only encouraged 
the Soviet Union to make gains in the Middle East. Troops and assets in Egypt were proposed 
to be moved to Libya and Ethiopia, in the increasingly likely event that rights in Palestine 
would be lost. Britain’s remaining positions in Iraq and Transjordan were therefore ever more 
vital, the last significant shields that British forces were stationed in, between the Soviet 
Union and Egypt. If Palestine created large complications with Britain’s last remaining 
military allies, resulting in a similar situation in Egypt, then Britain’s military and therefore 
political clout in the Middle East would have been wholly diminished. This would jeopardize 
British security and remove her from being able to defend the Middle East from Soviet 
influence, and limit possibilities in offensive operations against the Soviet Union in the case 
of war.   
In the former mandate power of Iraq, the FO sought to maintain the British position. 
Two British air bases in Habbaniyah and Shaiba were important to retaining British air power 
in the region and for the conduction of strategic bombing runs against the Soviets. The 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930 also gave Britain full access to the nation’s 
infrastructure and full freedom of movement across Iraq.161 As in Egypt, growing discontent 
and demand for treaty revision was presenting issues. The Iraqi government was unpopular, 
and extremes on the right and left were making significant political gains in Iraq. The 
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government was under large pressure to take a leading role in defence of Palestine and 
growing anti-British sentiment had led to demands for a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 
Alliance.  
The FO recognized the issues, a Counsellor at the British Embassy in Iraq, Clinton 
Pelham, stated that some in the British government saw it as “unnecessarily rigid… to place 
Iraq too obviously in the position of a junior partner”. Furthermore, a member of the Iraqi 
government had issued a statement arguing “that the treaty was not a fit instrument for 
strengthening the ties of friendship between Iraq and the United Kingdom and rejected it.”162 
The Iraqi government’s concerns were heard, and the FO understood the significant domestic 
pressures they faced, due to growing Iraqi nationalism. Douglas Busk, an official working in 
the Bagdad Embassy wrote “The tide of nationalism is rising in the Middle East… but 
perhaps slower in Iraq then elsewhere.”163 There was growing awareness of the pressures 
Arab nations faced domestically, and the rise in Arab nationalism was causing a rejection of 
British imperialism in the Middle East, and this made maintaining military rights and a 
paramount position there increasingly unlikely. Further evidence of FO concern over anti-
British nationalism in Iraq is displayed in Baxter’s writing, “The extreme Right and extreme 
Left are at one in vociferating against British ‘imperialism’ with particular reference to 
Palestine”.164 The FO had to maintain British rights in Iraq, and rising nationalism and 
rejection of British imperialism in Iraq needed to be addressed. The need of Arab goodwill 
was therefore vital, and the FO sought to minimize any damage caused by Britain’s 
increasingly untenable position in Palestine, and from any policy decisions that followed 
thereafter.  
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Louis believed that Busk and the Eastern Department understood the situation, and 
argued that they acknowledged the nationalist problem, “Busk believed it essential 
immediately to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the nationalists…”165 FO consideration 
of this is further shown when Michael Wright, also of the Eastern Department, argued that 
“Better a compromise now in Iraq which has a better chance of lasting, than to hang on a 
short time loner there on a wicket which will soon altogether become unplayable.”166 To 
which Bevin replied: “I agree”.167 This shows that the FO was aware of the potential for Iraq 
to become another Egypt, and that they needed to accommodate Iraq sooner rather than later 
to maintain a credible position in the Middle East. The FO sought to proceed with treaty 
revision with an understanding of the anti-British nationalist issue in Iraq. But as events in 
Palestine came to a head, and the UN voted for partition, the FO became increasingly 
concerned over Palestine’s ability to make treaty revision in Iraq improbable. Peter Garran, of 
the Eastern Department, wrote “although our own attitude over Palestine should serve to 
retain the goodwill of the Arabs, it may well become impracticable to proceed...”168 
Considering the events in Palestine Busk asked the Iraq Regent directly if the Iraqi 
government wished for a new agreement, stating “we would set the machine in motion at 
once” to which he stated “his government did want it”.169 Despite this assurance, the 
following month the Iraq government stated that it faced three major issues: “Palestine, 
economic development and Treaty revision.”170 The FO therefore saw Palestine as a major 
geopolitical problem, which was helping to fuel Arab nationalism against Western 
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imperialism and ultimately could result in further losses for Britain position in the Middle 
East.  
During 1947-1948, work between the FO and Iraq on a treaty based more around the 
idea of equal partners was agreed, and by January 1948 the treaty was revised. The British 
agreed to share its airbases in Iraq and train Iraqi pilots. Also, the British would arm and 
supply the Iraqi army for the immediate future. Two clauses created a large backlash in Iraq. 
These were the joint planning board which decided Iraq’s military planning and the control 
Britain would still maintain over Iraq’s foreign policy. By May 1948, there was fierce 
opposition within Iraq in opposition to this. Strikes, riots and an eventual rejection of the 
treaty by the Regent himself destroyed all hopes of a renewed alliance with Iraq. Louis 
argued that “The Iraqi debacle did not increase the Foreign Offices faith in alliances with 
Arab governments.”171 Wright displayed such feeling, writing to Busk, “as you may 
guess…one of the results at this end increase in doubts in many quarters of the wisdom of 
ever placing any reliance whatever on anything that Arab countries say or do…”172 Like in 
Egypt, anti-British nationalism resulted in  demands for the British to leave. The FO had 
considered this outcome possible, and the FO clearly considered Palestine’s major influence 
on Arab relations.  Pelham noted “Iraqi opinion, in common with other Arab opinion, has 
grown steadily more and more concerned with what seems to them the manifest injustice of 
the National Home policy in Palestine…”173 Frustrations were clear, and the argument that 
Palestine was causing major handicaps to FO diplomacy among the Arab world is reiterated 
by the Minster in Damascus, P.M.Broadmead “If it had not been for Palestine, we should 
have seen the treaty ratified.”174 From the FO’s perspective Palestine was therefore a major 
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political issue, which undermined all its attempts to strengthen the wavering relations with 
Arab states. The withdrawal and future partition of Palestine had become not just about the 
major loss of Britain’s largest military bases and garrisons, it had engulfed FO attempts to 
maintain and extend existing military rights in Egypt and Iraq, causing a significant reduction 
in Britain’s future military position in the Middle East.  
The future of British forces in Egypt and Iraq faced uncertainty during 1947-48. 
However, in Transjordan, Britain felt more secure. John Troutbeck, Head of the Middle East 
Department, argued that there was a tendency to “hold fast to Transjordan which is our only 
reliable ally, and let the rest hang.”175 Transjordan strategically was not as valuable to Britain 
as Iraq or Egypt in terms of facilities, however it did have the military garrison at Amman, 
the Arab Legion, and proximity to Palestine. Transjordan was also a communication center, 
connecting Egypt and Palestine with Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Sargent displayed concern that 
Transjordan might fall victim to a similar situation that had occurred in Egypt or Iraq, 
“Although we can easily make a new Treaties with certain friendly politicians or the local 
King or Regent, when we try to get them ratified we run up against a new force which the 
ruling classes can no longer control, namely a new Arab nationalism… which would be 
foolish to ignore.”176 Adding Transjordan to the growing list of disasters would have 
drastically reduced British power in the Middle East. Fortunately, the FO had many 
advantages in trying to maintain its alliance with Transjordan. Britain contributed £2 million 
in subsidies, provided officers for the Arab legion, had armed them, and King Abdullah’s 
regime was created and backed by the British.177 Louis argued, “in a sort of symbiotic 
relationship stretching over a quarter of a century, Abdullah had remained a steadfast friend 
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of the British Empire, and the British had remained faithful to him.”178 Furthermore, 
Kirkbride was personally on highly favourable terms with Abdullah. Pappe stated that 
“Britain’s dominate role in Transjordan was due to Sir Alec Kirkbride’s immense influence 
on King Abdullah.”179 Pappe goes as far to claim that British policy towards the Palestine 
crises and “to a lesser extent towards the Middle East as a whole were based on a strong 
Anglo-Transjordan alliance.” Transjordan was substantially smaller than Egypt and Iraq, due 
to its size, resources, economy, and population. Nor did it enjoy leadership in the Arab 
League unlike Egypt and Iraq. However, the British did have one advantage in Transjordan 
relations. Kirkbride had been the British representative in Transjordan since 1920 and had 
welcomed Abdullah when he first arrived in Transjordan and had given him council when he 
became Emir of Transjordan. Their friendship is well documented,180 and Kirkbride’s 
position as the Ambassador to Transjordan is important when looking at FO policy resulting 
from the withdrawal of Palestine. This is because Kirkbride had a large personal influence on 
the King, Transjordan was Britain’s closest ally, and the nation’s proximity to Palestine made 
it strategically important in any actions in Palestine from Arab neighbours.  With the situation 
in Egypt “doomed”181 and rejection of the British in Iraq, Transjordan become increasingly 
relevant, as the British began losing its position elsewhere in the Middle East.  
The British had recently signed a new treaty with Transjordan in March 1945, which 
gave the British military access to Transjordan in many forms. To develop the port of Aqaba, 
to transport troops and maintain two air bases at Amman and Mafrak. This treaty was valid 
for twenty-five years. Therefore, the FO did not have to focus on treaty revision dictating 
relations. The treaty was revised in 1948 to remove the control of the British Army over the 
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Arab Legion, and replace it with joint board of defence but was do so in an uncomplicated 
manner, and its changes were even recommend by the COS to give the appearance of lesser 
British control.182 Complications in the relationship over Palestine did emerge though. By 
September 1946, Abdullah’s intentions had become clear. In a telegram to the FO, Campbell 
reported that “Abdullah who was in favour of partition and thought it best that (the) Arab 
State should be joined to Transjordan.” 183 Abdullah’s desire for Palestinian land became a 
major preoccupation for the FO causing divisions, notably, between Kirkbride and Sargent. 
These included reductions on subsidies and officers for the Arab Legion, combined with the 
decision to no longer issue new weapon orders left Kirkbride frustrated “I have been struck 
by the tendency, [to] present in telegrams concerning the attitude of the Arab States on the 
subject of developments in Palestine, to handicap our allies and to make the handicap most 
serve to these states which are most closely allied to Great Britain.”184 Kirkbride believed 
Britain was impairing its ability to maintain a paramount position in the Middle East by 
restricting its allies; “One of the greatest obstacles in the past to the achievement of our 
policy of securing regional defence agreements with the Middle East (or Arab) states has 
been the suspicion that such agreements would be used by His Majesty’s Government as an 
indirect means of restricting the freedom of these countries.”185 
Sargent, however, believed this to be an exaggeration. Saying Britain did “not (want) 
to put obstacles in the way of States who have had the courage to enter into and maintain 
satisfactory agreements... And I do not think that the decisions taken really have this 
effect.”186 Issuing new weapon orders would he believed, “cause serious controversy and lay 
 
182 I.Pappe, p.121 
183 Cairo to Foreign Office, 2 February 1946, FO141/1090/12048140/1416, TNA. 





us open to the most damaging accusations in the U.S.A.”187 Correspondence between the two 
continued to show clear division with Kirkbride reiterating his objections to the intended 
measures, arguing that the close cooperation between His Majesty’s Forces and the Arab 
Legion had “at one time appeared to be a model of a defence arrangement between a small 
and great power”. Now Kirkbride argued “to take steps to cripple this tactical force…. will be 
a poor advertisement of our policy.”188 Barring Arab nations from new weapon orders and 
limiting a key ally, Kirkbride argued would “undo part of what we have built up in the past, 
and probably ensure that no Arab State would bind itself to us in the military sense.”189 
Kirkbride believed that the Transjordan alliance was a model for other junior military allies, 
and was passionate about not prejudicing a nation for being an ally. Sargent did not believe 
this to be the case and was more concerned of the international problems that could stem 
from Britain’s closest regional ally becoming heavily and independently involved in 
Palestine.     
Kirkbride wanted Abdullah to have the means and freedom in pursing his desired 
course, which he believed would significantly strengthen Britain’s position after withdrawal.  
He saw the alternative as a “non-viable Palestine Arab State under the Mufti” as “not 
attractive”190, the Mufti was strongly anti-British, actively opposing them in Palestine at the 
time. Despite the differences between Kirkbride and Sargent on obstructing Transjordan, both 
agreed on the advantage of Transjordan absorbing the Arab parts of Palestine, after the 
British withdrew. Sargent stated, “We entirely agree with you in seeing considerable 
advantage in the occupation of part or the whole of the Arab areas of Palestine by King 
Abdullah”.191 This is significant, as Britain was considering the benefits of Transjordan 
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annexing part of Palestine, in order to strengthen its ally, which could provide Britain with a 
way to maintain rights in Palestine via Transjordan annexation. However, this had the 
potential to backfire on the British and cause Arab resentment towards Britain and 
Transjordan for compromising on accepting a Jewish state.  
Consensus on this end was met with difficulties in the meantime. Kirkbride showed 
concern that if Britain did not directly facilitate Transjordanian expansion, the British 
government would still be blamed regardless.  Kirkbride argued that Britain should secure its 
interests regardless;  
“Great Britain will be blamed in many quarters for what the Arab States do but we are 
so often blamed for what we do with the best of intentions and with the loss to our 
own interests, that we might, in this instance, secure our interests and disregard the 
criticism, which will, doubtless, follow as a matter of course whether it is deserved or 
not.”192  
As well as considering Britain’s reputation, there was concern in the FO and COS that 
damage to Transjordan’s position in the Arab world could have serious security ramifications 
for Abdullah.193 Sargent wondered if annexation “could be done without either too serious 
trouble with the United Nations or the loss of Abdullah’s whole position in the Arab 
world.”194 Beeley similarly expressed these concerns and argued that intervention from 
Transjordan could put Britain in a embarrassing international position, and if Abdullah acted 
without the support of other Arab states, he too would become alienated. Beeley believed that 
Abdullah would only gain the support of Arab states if he was to defy the UN partition plan.  
Occupying more territory then was allocated to the Arabs, which would have large 
 
192 Kirkbirde to Sargent, 18 November 1947, FO371/61584/12048415/ E11734/G/390, TNA. 
193 Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Minster of Defence, 26th February 1948, [Accessed 
Online 11/11/19], <https://nationalarchives.gov.uk/>, FO800/487/PA/48/18, TNA, p.121 
194 Sargent to Kirkbride, 22nd December 1947, FO371/61584/12048415/ E11734/G, TNA. 
76 
 
consequences on Britain’s international position.195 Avi Shlaim assessed that Kirkbride 
opposed this and that he was the driving force in the FO to push for an endorsement of 
Abudllah’s plans, arguing that “He was confident that the annexation… represented the best 
possible means to preserve British interests in the region and to prevent the spread of Soviet 
influence.”196 A matter which Shlaim concluded was not popular within the FO, arguing that 
this “was strongly disputed by Brigadier Clayton, Sir Ronald Campbell, and other British 
Officials.”197 The FO felt it could not publicly support Abdullah on this matter, despite 
Kirkbride’s calls. Publicly endorsing such a move would damage relations with the United 
States and undermine the London Conference were the Arabs held a common position, and it 
had the potential to isolate both countries regionally, and internationally. However, this did 
not cause Britain or the FO to put pressure on Abdullah to abandon this plan. 
Impending civil war in Palestine, and probable loss of rights there, alongside failure in 
Egypt and Iraq to extend Britain’s military presence, made relations with Abdullah more 
valuable.  Jones has argued that “Transjordan was expected to become more strategically 
valuable”, and therefore “the British Government winked benevolently at Abdullah’s 
ambitions.”198 This ‘wink’ was the result of a meeting between Tawfik Abu al-Huda (Prime 
Minster of Transjordan) and Bevin in London on 7 February 1948. John Bagot Glubb, British 
Commander of the Arab Legion and military adviser to Transjordan, translated during this 
secret meeting, and his personal account was extremely revealing. In Glubb’s account Abu 
Al-Huda argued that Palestine would become dominated by the Jews or Mufti which “would 
not suit either Britain or Transjordan” and that Transjordan was “receiving many requests and 
petitions from Palestine Arab notables” for the protection of the Arab Legion. Abu Al-Huda 
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proposed that the Arab Legion should move into the Arab areas along the frontier of 
Transjordan, to which Bevin twice stated “It seems the obvious thing to do.” Bevin is said to 
have warned Abu- Al-Huda not go into Jewish areas, allocated under the UN partition plan, 
to which both men agreed. Glubb then goes on to state that “Mr. Bevin thanked Taufiq Pasha 
(Abu Al-Huda) for his frank exposition of the position of Trans-Jordan, and expressed his 
agreement with the plans put forward.”199 Glubb’s account shows collusion between the two 
allies over the fate of Palestine, and Transjordan’s future role in it. The encounter is 
remarkable, it went against the position of the Cabinet, which Shlaim states offered “no 
comfort or reassurance whatever for the troubled ruler of Transjordan”200. It also went against 
the warnings within the Eastern Department, from Beeley, Clayton and Campbell, as well as 
Sargent’s own assessment of the potential risks of Abdullah’s plans. Despite concerns within 
the FO there was still some support for Kirkbride. Sargent and Beeley did consider the 
significant advantages of an enlarged Transjordan, however this did not remove the clear 
reservations that it could have disastrous consequences on Britain’s and Transjordan relations 
with the Arab states.  
Overall, the FO did not seek to prevent Transjordan’s intended annexation of parts of 
Palestine which it later undertook, instead seeing the potential benefits to its last reliable 
regional ally who was willing to commit to a future with Britain. The British position in 
Palestine and the potential of partition was met with fierce opposition in Egypt and Iraq. As a 
result, Transjordan became a priority as Britain’s only reliable regional ally, and the FO tried 
to turn events in Palestine to their advantage. Bevin privately endorsed Abdullah’s 
annexation plan, however there was concern in the FO that it could alienate Abdullah among 
the Arab states, and Britain. The FO wished to prioritise Arab goodwill during the withdrawal 
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from Palestine, in an attempt to engage in successful treaty renegotiation with other Arab 
states. This was needed to fulfill Britain’s security requirements, and in the hope of finding a 




















Arab Unity and the London Conference 
The key challenges Palestine created for the FO when attempting to maintain Arab goodwill 
and its position among its three key regional allies has been discussed. However, the FO did 
not approach the Arab states on an entirely individual basis when trying to limit the damage 
Palestine was increasingly causing to the British position. The FO sought to maintain Arab 
goodwill in a general sense, this is frequently cited in countless FO documents surrounding 
the subject, as well as the historiography, Ovendale concluded that “The salient feature of this 
period was the persistent effort on the part of the British… to support the Arabs and thereby 
to sustain British power in the Middle East”.201 While Jones argued that “the motivation was, 
as always, the concern to be seen to be doing the right thing by the Arab world, thereby 
safeguarding the strategic and commercial essential in the Middle East, Arab Goodwill.”202 
The FO sought to maintain undivided Arab goodwill by dealing with them collectively under 
the union of the Arab League. To do this, the FO organised the London Conference of 1946-
47, a series of meetings between September 1946 and February 1947. Here the British 
planned to mediate an agreement between the Arabs and Jews. The members of the Arab 
League, the Jewish Agency and the Palestine Arab Higher Executive were invited to attend in 
the hope of a resolution. Unfortunately, The Jewish Agency and Arab Higher Executive 
refused to attend. Despite this fact the conference went ahead, without Arab or Jewish 
representation from Palestine. This is as remarkable as it is important because it shows that 
the FO was still willing to mediate a settlement over Palestine, with the unified Arab position, 
without Palestinian representation being present from either side. This demonstrates the 
importance of maintaining the goodwill of historic Arab allies, as the FO mediated a 
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conference solely with them, with the two actual parties in Palestine in absence, showing 
what the FO priority was, keeping the goodwill of neighboring and allied Arab nations.  
Jones argues that the FO placed too much priority on maintaining Arab goodwill, 
keeping the Arabs unified and dealing with them collectively. That this sole drive dominated 
all FO motives and that the FO missed opportunities to create compromise on Palestine. This 
is an argument present in more modern historiography and is used as a criticism to why 
negotiations failed. Jones argues that “There is evidence to suggest a positive aversion in the 
FO towards anything which might fragment a unified Arab position or facilitate a 
compromise deal on Palestine outside of the London Conference.”203 This criticism is 
founded in the argument that Palestine was not represented at the conference, yet the FO went 
ahead with its policy. The FO failed to apply possible pressures on the Arab states, which 
could have helped secured a compromise more acceptable to the Jewish Agency. Such 
pressures are mentioned within FO sources, Norman Young , the British Ambassador in 
Beirut, wrote “There is quite a lot of heat which we could if necessary turn on both in Syria 
and in Lebanon, as regard the former there is Greater Syria and as regards the latter there is 
Emile Edde.”204 The Greater Syria ‘leverage’ being the threat that Abdullah sought to unify 
Transjordan and Syria under his premier, John Beith  of the FO’s Eastern Department noted 
“The Syrian Government are disproportionately sensitive about all this.”205 Emile Edde was 
the exiled former President of Lebanon, whom the Lebanese government feared may attempt 
to negotiate a return, with British assistance. This provides another example of possible 
leverages to use on the Arab states. These “trump cards”206 as Young stated, where not used 
and such pressures were not brought upon Syria or Lebanon to influence their positions at the 
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London Conference. The FO was aware of the diplomatic leverage the British held and did 
not recommend applying due to the loss of Arab goodwill that would result, and possibly 
fragment the Arab position.  
Further evidence that the FO could have pressed the Arab’s to accept partition has 
been documented. Sassoon (Jewish Agency) held meetings with Sidky and Abdullah to get 
some form of Partition accepted from the Arab quarter. Reiterating Kirkbride’s views from 
earlier, Wikeley stated “King Abdullah has I think always been inclined to favour Partition, 
as he hopes to absorb the Arab part of Palestine.”207 The inclination of Kirkbride and Sargent 
towards this and the rational for this were dealt with earlier, the importance of this is in the 
fact Transjordan was not the only key regional ally in the Arab League who privately 
expressed partition could be accepted. Among the pressures which could have been applied to 
Syria and Lebanon, FO sources also had cited some indifference to the whole affair in Egypt, 
and that partition could be favoured publicly if the British would be more proactive in 
pushing Egypt and the Arabs. An FO official in the Egyptian Department claimed that the 
Egyptian Government’s “attitude will probably be a compromise between their fundamental 
lack of interest in the whole business of Palestine and the necessity of taking an extremist line 
in order to maintain their hegemony over the Arab League.”208 Campbell’s Annual Reports 
on Egypt (1947-48) support an argument for Palestine being of lesser importance for Egypt, 
with the focus on the evacuation of British troops, treaty revision and the Sudan issue 
previously mentioned.209 In a telegram Campbell argued that Egypt “do not feel so strongly 
as the Arabs about Palestine” and goes on to suggest “partially because they would like to 
conciliate us over Palestine in the hope we will respond by being conciliatory about the 
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Anglo-Egyptian treaty.”210 This provides evidence that the FO saw potential for 
accommodation from Egypt in regards to the partition of Palestine. Campbell argued that 
Azzam Pasha, the Egyptian first Secretary-General of the Arab League was “afraid of getting 
the ball rolling” and that if “the initiative were taken by a representative of any other Arab 
state he would probably play up.”211 This is significant, while motivated by Abdullah’s 
ambitious, Transjordan was open to partition, and there is some evidence Egypt would have 
been if another Arab state supported it, or in return for British concessions on treaty revision 
and/or in Sudan.  
The FO recognized potential exploits in the unified Arab position, it discussed; 
leverages over Syria and Lebanon, Abdullah’s desire to annex Arab Palestine, and possible 
concession to Egypt in treaty revision and the Sudan. These discussions however did not 
develop, Britain did not press Syria or Lebanon on these matters previously mentioned, and 
despite the ‘benevolent wink’ Britain gave to Abdullah’s vision, they did not become 
involved in the execution his plans. The London Conference had failed to provide a solution, 
Campbell reported that Egypt viewed the London Conference “with great apprehension” and 
saw “no chance of it being successful.” Despite low prospects of success at the London 
Conference, private diplomacy with Egypt failed to develop into high level discussions over 
concessions in Sudan to gain cooperation in Palestine. Sargent relayed the view of Bevin in a 
telegram to Campbell “You can leave him (Sidky) in no doubt that the interests of His 
Majesty’s Government are not, and never will be, the counters in a bargain of this kind.”212 
Jones argued that “clearly the prospect of a deal over Palestine involving the Anglo-Egyptian 
treaty negotiations and above all Britain’s strategic requirements in the Middle East had 
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touched a raw nerve.”213 Therefore, compromising on Sudan in order to fulfill the COS 
demands for bases in Palestine was rejected by Bevin and Sargent. Beeley displays the 
sentiments behind not pursing this, “if we were to enter into a bargain of this kind we should 
quickly find ourselves in an embarrassing position” arguing “The other Arab states would not 
see the matter in the same light as Transjordan and Egypt – the two beneficiaries of the 
deal.”214 This echoed Sargent’s concerns to Kirkbride, that supporting Transjordan could 
result in a fierce backlash in the Arab world. Considering these examples there is evidence 
that the FO was aware of the possibilities and benefits of dealing with the Arab states on an 
individual basis to force a compromise on Palestine. Jones criticized the FO “Dedication to 
the belief in maintaining the unity of the Arab world” which he argued “precluded the 
Foreign Office from making use of the rivalries and differences among the Arab states to 
bring diplomatic pressure to bear over Palestine.” Concluding that the FO failed to “discard 
Arab unity as fiction” and deny the Arabs “a right to meddle en masse.215 It is certainly 
plausible dealing with the Arab states together, at the London Conference was less likely to 
obtain compromise. Any deviation from the united Arab position would not only alienate a 
nation diplomatically but also could have serious ramifications from domestic pressures 
within the country itself. Senior FO officials including Kirkbride, Campbell, Young and 
Beith expressed potential diplomatic pressures or collaborations to purse with respective 
individual states, urging actions outside of the joint discussions of the London conference, yet 
Sargent and Bevin declined to pursue additional pressures on the Arabs. 
The Middle Eastern Department and senior FO officials had expressed potential ways 
to pressure individual Arab states, and it is certainly true that Sargent and Bevin did not purse 
this course, rather seeking accommodation on Palestine. However, this does not mean that 
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arguments from Jones that the FO was obsessed with dealing with the Arab states on an 
entirely collaborative basis over Palestine are correct. This fails to consider the FO’s 
understanding and concern over the growing Arab nationalism, and the pressure the Arab 
governments were under to appease this growing sentiment, which Palestine helped fuel. The 
ability to gain individual concessions or cooperation from Arab states was severely limited 
due to their domestic situations. Engaging in a course separate to their Arab neighbors could 
cause a serious, if not fatal backlash in their respective nations.  
There is historical consensus on the importance of rising Arab nationalism across the 
Middle East. Ovendale argued that “the Arab States were moving away from colonial 
tutelage”216 and the nationalist pressures on the Arab governments is looked at by Fitzsimons 
who argued “The Arab governments were readily vulnerable to nationalist agitation.”217 The 
pressures of these nationalist forces is similarly repeated in Louis’ work, with focus given to 
Iraq,218 and these are repeated by Monroe, arguing that the Iraqi people “no longer wanted the 
British milling around in their country”.219 There is a large amount of evidence of that the FO 
understood this. Campbell reported the pressures of nationalism in Egypt, writing about the 
anti-British protests that the government endorsed.220 Baxter warned of the extreme sides in 
Iraq were “at one in vociferating against British imperialism” .221  Busk argued to “adopt a 
conciliatory attitude towards the nationalists.”222 Wright argued “Better a compromise now in 
Iraq (with the nationalists)”. 223Amhed Pasha (Iraq Government Official) told the FO that the 
Iraq was “desperate over Palestine and it was essential for any Arab Government which 
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wished to remain in power to take the lead in defence of Palestine.” 224 Abdullah’s position In 
Transjordan was also not immune, with the FO entering treaty renegotiation in 1947, having 
only signed the last treaty two years prior, to give an impression of lesser British interference 
and reduce criticism domestically.  
The warnings of rising Arab nationalism were heard by Sargent, who wrote that this 
new Arab nationalism “would be foolish to ignore”225 attributing Arab nationalism to causing 
the rejection of the revised Iraq treaty. The FO was acutely aware of the large pressures Arab 
states were under, Palestine had helped fuel Arab nationalism and this severely limited the 
abilities of the FO regarding Palestine. Arab nationalism and a rejection of imperialism had 
resulted in a rejection of the British position in Egypt, and the rejection of the current treaty. 
In Iraq, nationalism was fueling similar rejection of the British presence and resulted in the 
rejection of the revised treaty, and even in Transjordan treaty renegotiation had occurred only 
two years after ratification, to help strengthen Abdullah’s position. Despite an awareness of 
Arab nationalism, the FO did fail to obtain favorable terms to strengthening Britain position 
in the Middle East overall. However, the idea that the FO could have engaged in successful 
individual diplomacy outside of the London Conference, and pressured an Arab state or two 
to compromise against their own agendas, under the nationalist pressures they faced seems 
unlikely.  
The withdrawal from Palestine immediately presented a major security dilemma for 
the COS and MOD and had the potential to substantially undermine British influence and 
power in the Middle East, which was regarded as essential to British security. The COS 
insisted on future military rights in Palestine, which without argued would “gravely 
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prejudiced”226 Britain’s strategic position. The future governance of Palestine was uncertain 
and both sides were unlikely to be sympathetic to British strategic considerations. The FO 
therefore had to mitigate the impending loss of Palestine. The only way to maintain a 
paramount position in the Middle East was to maintain existing rights with other Arab states, 
or ideally strengthen them. So, the FO prioritized favorable relations with the Arab states that 
already granted British military rights in their territories. Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan all had 
significant interests in the future of Palestine and were tied to British strategic plans, 
therefore the FO put priority on maintaining Arab goodwill, in the hope that it would enable 
renewal of ties with these nations. 
Campbell reported little hope for a future renewal of Anglo-Egyptian ties. This was 
due to Egypt’s demand for British evacuation of their lands and demands for the future 
governance of Sudan. Campbell was therefore pessimistic over treaty negotiations with Egypt 
who began leading efforts in the Arab League “to work for a united Arab Palestine.”227 Egypt 
was seen as essential in preventing a hypothetical Soviet invasion of the Middle East and had 
housed by 1947 over 200,000 military personal. The FO did seek to maintain Arab goodwill 
but the situation in Egypt was becoming untenable in Egypt, even before Palestine became a 
more significant consideration in Egyptian foreign policy. Sidky had threatened to bring the 
matter of British evacuation to the United Nations. He was also vocal in the Arab League to 
its opposition to a continued British presence. Campbell reported that treaty revision was 
“doomed”228 due to Egyptian insistence on including Sudan in the negotiations, and the only 
potential for any compromise came from the reported meeting between Sassoon and Sidky. 
Where they allegedly discussed potential concession on Sudan and the demand for evacuation 
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with the possibility of new rights in Palestine in a future Jewish state, an idea outright 
rejected by Bevin.229 This idea was only reported and not recommended to purse by the FO, 
and with the only potential leverage rejected as off limits by Bevin and the FO began 
preparations on gaining new rights elsewhere. This placed greater importance on the need to 
maintain relations with Iraq and Transjordan, and Iraq was becoming increasingly engulfed 
by the Palestine problem and Transjordan becoming increasingly involved.  The FO 
understood the importance of withdrawal to these nation reporting that main issue facing the 
Iraq government was Palestine. 230 Rising Arab nationalism and a rejection of the British 
presence was not limited to Egypt. In Iraq, the government was facing similar demand for 
British evacuation, unlike in Egypt the FO did manage to successfully negotiate the 
Portsmouth Treaty of 1948 with the Iraqi government. This was embarked on as essential to 
maintaining any presence in Iraq. Busk, Pelham, Baxter and Wright all from the Eastern 
Department, reported rising nationalism and the need to accommodate Iraq, which was 
agreed upon by Sargant. The FO proceeded to improve relations with Iraq and granted a 
revised deal, however this failed to be ratified, and its unpopularity led to it being condemned 
by the Iraq people and then Regent after mass rioting and protest. Pelham231, Busk,232 and 
Beeley233 each spoke of how Palestine had prevented revision, a matter agreed upon by 
Sargant who reported the hopeless of negotiation when Arab nationalism would prevent any 
treaty being ratified.234 This left the FO in a serious predicament. The withdrawal from 
Palestine and failure to pacify Egyptian demands, as well as obtain a ratified treaty with Iraq 
left the FO with Transjordan, which Troutbeck stated “is our only reliable ally”.235 The FO 
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was concerned of Palestine engulfing relations with Abdulla, but the close relations between 
the two nations and British financial and military involvement in the Transjordan meant that 
the FO faced few challenges in renewing ties. On 15 March 1948, the FO negotiated a 
successful revision of the Treaty of London 1946 and ties were renewed, with the British 
having extensive military rights; freedom of passage, the right to station troops, permission to 
develop two airfields at Amman and Mafrak and a port in Aqaba. This success ended the 
successive loss and rejections of future ties which started from Palestine, continued with 
Egypt, and ended in Iraq.  
The extent of negotiations surmised above show the importance of Egypt, Iraq, and 
Transjordan to British defence plans. The diplomacy the FO undertook surrounding the 
withdrawal from Palestine was very considerate of maintaining Arab goodwill to help enable 
these negotiations to go successfully. The FO motivation to maintain Arab goodwill was 
important for successful future ties with these nations, and the FO believed this was in 
jeopardy, due to Arab nationalism. In Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan this was helping fuel a 
more vocal and at times violent demand from their people for the British to leave. The 
Eastern Department started reporting this as a major concern during the last quarter of 1947, 
with Busk reporting that “The tide of nationalism is rising”236 and Baxter stating nationalist 
forces were “in one in vociferating against British ‘imperialism’”.237 The Eastern Department 
reported grave concern at the affect Palestine was having on Arab nationalism, and the effects 
it was having on relations on other Arab states. Baxter believed that Arab nationalists’ desires 
were in “particular reference to Palestine”238, and Beeley stated Palestine as the main issuing 
consuming Iraq. Pelham agreed with this and added that, Arab opinion was becoming “more 
and more concerned with what seems to them the manifest injustice of the National Home 
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policy in Palestine”.239 The FO held large concern over Palestine and rising Arab nationalism, 
and the prospect of future treaties with Arab states is shown further, when Garran stated “our 
own attitude over Palestine should serve to retain the goodwill of the Arabs” and then warned 
“that it may well become impracticable to proceed”.240 The attribution of failure to renewed 
ties because of Arab nationalism, and the importance of maintaining Arab goodwill was 
repeated by Broadmead when he argued that “that if it had not been for Palestine, we should 
have seen that treaty ratified”241 in reference to the failure in Iraq. These concerns in the FO 
were not limited to the Eastern Department and evidence shows Sargent understood and 
shared these views. In his disagreement with Kirkbride over Transjordan, he was concerned 
of alienating both Abdullah and Britain if they endorsed Abdullah’s annexation plans in 
Palestine.242 By February 1948 he even seemed disillusioned with Arab nationalism when he 
argued “we (have) run up against a new force which the ruling classes can no longer control, 
namely a new Arab nationalism… which would be foolish to ignore.”243 The FO prioritized 
and was united in the desire to maintain Arab goodwill, in order to pacify Arab nationalism, 
in the hope it could successfully negotiate future ties and military rights with these nations, in 
order to safeguard British strategic interests in the region and mitigate for the substantial loss 
of rights in Palestine and most likely Egypt.  
The priority that the FO put on maintaining Arab goodwill is also reinforced by Jones. 
He argues the FO focused too much on keeping the Arabs united, and on side. The rational 
for this is the FO focus on using the London Conference to mediate a solution for Palestine. 
A perceived failure of the FO to force some Arab states to go against their unified position 
within the Arab League, and their united rejection of partition and demands to end to efforts 
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to create a Jewish National Home in Palestine. It was argued in the previous chapter that the 
FO did not wish to alienate the Arabs in order to accommodate the Americans, and FO 
documents show a unified consensus in the need to maintain Arab goodwill. Ovendale, Louis, 
Fitzsimons and Monroe also state that this was a FO objective, although none specifically 
dedicate their narratives of withdrawal around what the FO did and thought. Jones is more 
relevant than the others as he is dedicated to destroying the FO handling of withdrawal, 
arguing that failure in Palestine was because of a FO aversion to anything that may divide 
and agitate the Arab states. Jones believed that the FO failed to press Arab states when it 
could have successfully done so. Arguments that Egypt could have been coaxed into going 
against Arab opinion, against its own domestic pressures and against its own leading position 
in the Arab League seem highly unlikely. Egypt did want future governance of Sudan, and 
that was a possible leverage. However, Egypt did not suggest this regarding Palestine, only in 
relation to treaty revision, with Campbell reporting the two were inseparable.244 The only 
evidence of the idea being discussed in Egypt was from a reported ‘police source’ which 
stated that Sassoon and Sidky discussed the possibility. Hardly a strong foundation to an 
argument that Egypt would go against it’s; regional allies, leading and vocal demands in the 
Arab League, as well as the political and public opinion in Egypt. The only Arab state the FO 
could have possibly applied pressure was on Abdullah, who wanted to annex the Arab 
population of Palestine and seemed happy to do so even at the expense of a new Jewish state 
in Palestine. Kirkbride did suggest that such a move could be beneficial, and Sargent even 
agreed to an extent, but he was more concerned with “the loss of Abdullah’s position in the 
Arab world”245 if such action was taken, and there was greater concern from Sargent that it 
would do the same to Britain. This thereby reduced Arab goodwill and potentially isolated 
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Britain globally and from the United States. FO concern that backing annexation could have 
major implications for British relations with the entire Arab world outside of Transjordan, as 
well as its most important global ally the United States is an understandable position. The fact 
such action could also undo Abdullah’s own position, Britain’s only reliable Arab ally by the 
FO own assessment dismisses Jones argument, and shows just how concerned the FO was 
with maintaining Arab goodwill, not out of a single mindedness, but because of Arab 
nationalism the FO had extremely limited leverage which it could apply on any Arab state. 
Considering the FO could not even renew British rights and interests in Egypt and Iraq, and 
then had to renew ties with Abdullah, to satisfy an appearance of lesser British interference, it 
seems highly improbable that the FO could have forced Arab states to compromise on 
Palestine.  
The British withdrawal from Palestine presented the FO with major problems. The FO 
could not fulfill COS requirements for future rights in Palestine, therefore the FO’s prime 
focus was to retain Britain’s position in Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan. It was united in 
believing that Arab goodwill was vital to secure future rights, and the Eastern Department’s 
concerns of Arab nationalism were heard in London. Despite this awareness the FO failed to 
obtain successful treaty negotiation with Egypt or have its revisions with Iraq approved by 
parliament. Only in Transjordan did the FO find success, were it had far more advantages. 
The withdrawal from Palestine by the FO’s assessment had hindered attempts to renew ties, 
due to fueling Arab nationalism and the demands this placed on the Arab governments. The 
FO did not fail to apply leverages on Arab states where it could have easily done so. In Iraq 
and Egypt, the FO could not protect existing British interests. Only in Transjordan did the FO 
have any real leverage. The FO was unwilling to press this, as it risked isolating both Britain 
and Transjordan from the Arabs and the US. Damaging the position of Abdullah, Britain’s 
last reliable ally, posed the risk of a withdrawal from Palestine resulting in total loss of any 
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British position in the Middle East. The FO priority on retaining Arab goodwill is clear and 
was necessary for the FO to undertake any renewal of ties. The fact these failed, despite Arab 
goodwill being a priority, helps demonstrate just how strong rising Arab nationalism was, and 


























During this period Britain’s international position was changing. The Second World War 
helped fuel the deconstruction of large parts of the British Empire. As a result, Britain’s 
military presence in many parts of the world was being reduced. This changing position was 
occurring during the Soviet Union’s consolidation in Eastern Europe, with fears her reach 
may extend further into Europe and into the Middle East. The coming end of the British 
Mandate in Palestine created serious concerns for the COS, who consistently reiterated the 
importance of retaining military rights in Palestine, to retain Britain’s favourable strategic 
position in the Middle East. To Britain, maintenance of her paramount position in the Middle 
East was vital to counter Soviet influence, and for use as a possible offensive in case of war. 
The loss of rights in Palestine was recognized as the most likely outcome of to any solution 
due to unfavorable views both communities held towards the British. Therefore, the retention 
of military rights in other Arab nations was essential for Britain to mitigate the loss of 
Palestine, and to secure future British security for the region. It was on this understanding 
that the majority view in the FO was to accommodate the Arab’s, to retain goodwill and 
increase the likelihood of future British military rights being secured.  
It was under these circumstances that the Eastern Department rationalized the 
importance of favoring Anglo-Arab relations, a matter which was not dismissed by the 
Northern American Department. The involvement of the United States, and Bevin’s desire for 
an Anglo-American solution was met with little enthusiasm in the FO. Baxter, Beeley, Shone, 
Clayton, Stonehewer-Bird and Smart consistently warned against breaking the terms of the 
White Paper of 1939 to fulfill Truman’s immigration desires. Bevin’s desire for an Anglo-
American initiative only gained limited support within the FO, from Howe and Sargent. The 
former still sympathized with Eastern Department concerns and was involved in the Colonial 
Office alternative solution, and the latter still sympathized with the concerns the Eastern 
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Department was raising. Therefore, opposition to the Eastern Department concerns were 
limited. In the Northern American Department Inverchapel continued to warn of Truman 
inflexibility on the matters and Butler’s suggested rejecting Truman’s calls. This showed 
unity within the FO with a general view that American demands would prejudice Britain’s 
standing among the Arab states.  
Continued opposition to American involvement is demonstrated in the FO’s criticisms 
of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommendations. Baxter and Beeley warned 
that it would not provide a solution to the matter and that it would alienate the Arabs. Howe 
sympathized with this argument, going against his initial support for Bevin’s Anglo-
American initiative, to which Sargent reluctantly agreed. The concerns of the Eastern 
Department surrounding the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry were shared in the 
Cabinet to some extent, and Brook’s report condemning the committee recommendations was 
supported by Baxter and Beeley, who lead efforts to steer British policy away from the 
committee’s recommendations. Truman’s continued calls for permitting 100,000 Jews entry 
into Palestine concerned the Eastern Department so much that Beeley, Clayton, Kinahan, and 
Howe were willing to explore the Colonial Office’s provincial autonomy scheme, despite 
concerns surrounding the policy, in order to compromise on a solution which would exclude 
going against the White Paper. This compromise helped lead to the provincial autonomy 
scheme being used in the Morrison-Grady discussions, which accepted the plan. Despite the 
mutual acceptance from the British and Americans, Truman ultimately rejected the plan. This 
officially removed the United States from formal negotiations on the matter, and reduced the 
credibility of Turman with the British, shown by Attlee’s frustration, and Bevin’s 
disappointment. For most of the FO however, the end of an Anglo-American solution meant 
that finding a solution without alienating the Arabs would be more probable, and therefore a 
welcome development due to the overwhelming rejection of Truman’s calls. 
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The end of the Anglo-American initiative reduced the United States to the position of 
spectator, and during this time FO hostility to Truman’s demands continued.  When Truman 
stated that he might find congressional approval for financial assistance in delivering a 
solution, this was met with skepticism from Beeley and Sargent. When Goldmann presented 
his partition plan, which Acheson confirmed as a possible solution, Beeley and the Eastern 
Department rallied to warn Bevin it would ruin Britain’s position in the Middle East. The 
limited deviation from Howe and Sargent to the FO line was not apparent after Truman’s 
rejection of the Morrison-Grady plan, and Truman’s Yom Kippur statement. Which incited 
anger from a previously sympathetic Attlee and Bevin, this left little challenge to FO 
opposition to American desires. The only notable deviation from the FO line during this 
period was from Inverchapel who seemed to go beyond his remit and suggest the British may 
become more accommodating to American desires then actually was the case. Inverchapel 
sympathy to Truman’s domestic concerns and the case for partition did not have support from 
Butler, and Inverchapel was also openly criticized in the Eastern Department by Beeley. The 
Eastern Department was united in its opposition to American desires for the allowing 100,000 
Jews entry int Palestine, and later for a viable state in Palestine. American requests to scrap 
the White Paper and Truman’s attempts to influence a favourable outcome for the Zionist was 
met with hostility in the FO. Who saw such proposals as disastrous to Britain’s attempts to 
retain its position in the Middle East.  
The desire to retain Arab goodwill, and Britain’s position in the Middle East was the 
FO priority. The FO reported that Britain’s Palestine policy had the potential to engulf 
attempts to retain military rights in Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan. Reports from Campbell, 
Pelham and Garran argued that Palestine was becoming increasingly important to Egypt and 
Iraq, and that British actions over Palestine could prejudice hopes of favourable treaty 
revision. This was shown by riots, unrest and political turmoil in these nations which called 
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for the rejection of continued British presence, and desired Palestine to remain a united Arab 
nation.  The COS argued for the retention of rights in Palestine, a position the FO did not 
consider probable, however, to mitigate for this loss the Eastern Department sought to 
embark on successful treaty revision with Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan. It was in the 
continuation of military rights in these nations that the future of Britain’s position in the 
Middle East could be secured. The determination in the FO to neglect American calls was in 
order to maintain Arab goodwill. This was the main consideration for the FO because Britain 
was not in a strong position to renegotiate military rights with Iraq and Egypt. Building on 
the warnings of Campbell and Pelham, Busk, Broadmead and Baxter warned that rising Arab 
nationalism could cause a loss of British rights in these Arab States unless a “conciliatory 
attitude towards the nationalists”246 was found. In Transjordan Kirkbride sought to gain 
British support for Abdullah’s intended plan to annex part of Palestine, so not to alienate their 
only reliable regional ally, a matter which failed to gain official approval from Sargent, 
although the benefits of Abdullah’s ambitious were recognized, and secretly endorsed by 
Bevin. This development did not remove FO concerns regarding the policy, and priority 
within the FO was on finding a solution which did not alienate the other Arab states.   
The FO’s desire to maintain Arab goodwill is proven during the London Conference, 
where Britain sought to negotiate with the Arab states without the pressures or fallout from 
an Anglo-American solution. The conference went ahead without the formal participation of 
the Jewish Agency or Arab Higher Committee. This shows that the FO was willing to find 
accord with the Arab states, due to the communities in Palestine not being represented. 
During the London Conference Arab demands were heard and discussed, and during this time 
the FO did not seek to apply significant pressures on the Arab states in order to find a 
solution more acceptable to the Jewish Agency. Pressures which could have been applied on 
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Lebanon and Syria were not used, and following up Sassoon’s claims that partition could be 
agreed with Egypt and Transjordan if Britain made the initial steps were not taken. The FO 
did not attempt or recommend applying such pressures, and the warnings from Busk, 
Broadmead, Baxter of the growing problem of Arab nationalism were given priority, a matter 
Sargent began to agree upon.  Actions taken to divide or apply pressure to Egypt, Iraq and 
Transjordan could cause even greater domestic pressures on these governments to remove 
British influence. There was some division between Sargent and Kirkbride over Abdullah’s 
annexation plans. This could have extended British military rights in the Arab parts of 
Palestine, and the decision to not support this, despite great motive, was not pursued to 
maintain Arab unity and goodwill. It was therefore apparent that the FO was unwilling to 
press the Arab states to accommodate Jewish or American demands.  
The withdrawal from Palestine resulted in the FO trying to retain a British position in 
the Middle East which was becoming increasingly difficult due to rising Arab nationalism, 
which the FO believed was being fueled by events in Palestine. This was shown by demands 
for evacuation in Egypt, and the failure to get treaty revision ratified by the Iraqi parliament. 
Only in Transjordan could Britain mange to maintain its position, where it held considerable 
advantages. To the FO the Arab states were unlikely to go against their neighbors in the Arab 
League, and the public opinion of their nations. The priority was to not antagonize the Arab 
states further, in the hope of future military rights being granted. It was because of this the 
FO viewed Anglo-American cooperation with hostility, due to the insistence from Truman on 
scrapping the White Paper, which would greatly agitate the Arabs. The FO did not wish for 
wider Anglo-American cooperation to be affected; however, they were willing to argue 
against Truman’s desires in order to protect Britain’s own interests in the region. This 
occurred when the British sought to find a solution with the Arabs at the London Conference, 
where the United States was not present.  
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Overall, the Eastern Department, led by Baxter and Beeley called for the priority to be 
the maintenance of Arab goodwill, a view which was shared by the entire Eastern 
Department with the temporary and limited deviation from Howe. The Northern American 
Department lead by Butler shared these views, and the only deviation from Inverchapel was 
criticized. Sargent did not enthusiastically adhere to every call from his department, and 
attempted to support Bevin, however this support was largely absent after Truman’s rejection 
of the Anglo-American initiative. After this, Sargent was more sympathetic to his office’s 
views, and the damage alienating the Arabs was having on the prospects of Britain’s future 
position in the Middle East. The FO was mostly consistent and united in its concerns and 
desire to maintain Arab goodwill, which was shown by reluctance to pressure or divide the 
Arab States at the London Conference. The withdrawal from the perspective of the FO had 
the ability to undo Britain’s entire position in the Middle East if the Arab goodwill was not 
maintained. It was on this understanding that the FO was motivated to push for an Anglo-
Arab solution, even at the expense of excluding the Americans. This was in the hope of 
retaining a credible military position in the Middle East and preventing Soviet influence in a 
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